SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2003.06023

Causal Spillover Effects Using Instrumental Variables

Abstract

I set up a potential outcomes framework to analyze spillover effects using instrumental variables. I characterize the population compliance types in a setting in which spillovers can occur on both treatment take-up and outcomes, and provide conditions for identification of the marginal distribution of compliance types. I show that intention-to-treat (ITT) parameters aggregate multiple direct and spillover effects for different compliance types, and hence do not have a clear link to causally interpretable parameters. Moreover, rescaling ITT parameters by first-stage estimands generally recovers a weighted combination of average effects where the sum of weights is larger than one. I then analyze identification of causal direct and spillover effects under one-sided noncompliance, and show that causal effects can be estimated by 2SLS in this case. I illustrate the proposed methods using data from an experiment on social interactions and voting behavior. I also introduce an alternative assumption, independence of peers' types, that identifies parameters of interest under two-sided noncompliance by restricting the amount of heterogeneity in average potential outcomes.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Gonzalo Vazquez-Bare. 2020-03-12. Causal Spillover Effects Using Instrumental Variables. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.06023

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Identification in Linear Quantile Panel Models

This paper studies identification in linear quantile panel models with unrestricted individual heterogeneity when the number of time periods is fixed and small. We impose strict exogeneity, whereby the conditional quantile restriction holds given the individual's complete regressor history and latent individual effect, but otherwise allow the disturbances to be arbitrarily dependent over time.

econ.EM

Experimental Design for Policy Choice

We show how to optimally design experiments when the resulting data will be used to choose a welfare-maximizing policy subject to constraints. A decision maker seeks to maximize Bayes expected welfare by choosing a policy whose effects depend on an unknown finite-dimensional parameter. The decision maker has access to a first wave of experimental data with a fixed design but may choose the design of a second wave that will be collected before choosing the policy. The resulting experimental design--policy choice problem is a very high-dimensional dynamic program that is generally intractable in finite samples. We propose a tractable approximation based on the limit experiment and show it is asymptotically optimal using a new asymptotic representation theorem for adaptive experiments with continuous treatments. We apply the method to a conditional cash transfer experiment and demonstrate the potential for large gains from tailoring the experiment to the policy choice.

econ.EM

Designing Spatial Treatments

Spatial treatments are interventions assigned to locations potentially distinct from those of the responding units. We study their optimal design under a general model in which a unit's response diminishes with distance to a treated site. Our estimand of interest is an ``uncontaminated'' effect equal to the average impact of a single intervention site over all hypothetical sites. We propose a novel design based on a Mat\'{e}rn point process which separates treatments by a distance of at least $r$. A larger choice of $r$ reduces bias by separating interventions but increases variance by reducing their numerosity. We choose $r$ to maximize the rate of convergence of a Horvitz-Thompson estimator and prove that this is minimax rate-optimal. We provide weak conditions under which the estimator is asymptotically normal and propose a variance estimator.

econ.EM