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arXiv · 2009.14793

Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Rado Valuations

Jugal Garg·Edin Husic·Laszlo A. Vegh
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Abstract

We consider the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) while allocating a set of indivisible items to $n$ agents. The NSW is a popular objective that provides a balanced tradeoff between the often conflicting requirements of fairness and efficiency, defined as the weighted geometric mean of agents' valuations. For the symmetric additive case of the problem, where agents have the same weight with additive valuations, the first constant-factor approximation algorithm was obtained in 2015. This led to a flurry of work obtaining constant-factor approximation algorithms for the symmetric case under mild generalizations of additive, and $O(n)$-approximation algorithms for more general valuations and for the asymmetric case. In this paper, we make significant progress towards both symmetric and asymmetric NSW problems. We present the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for the symmetric case under Rado valuations. Rado valuations form a general class of valuation functions that arise from maximum cost independent matching problems, including as special cases assignment (OXS) valuations and weighted matroid rank functions. Furthermore, our approach also gives the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for the asymmetric case under Rado valuations, provided that the maximum ratio between the weights is bounded by a constant.

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BibTeXRIS

Jugal Garg, Edin Husic, Laszlo A. Vegh. 2020-09-30. Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Rado Valuations. https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.14793

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