arXiv subjects

Laszlo A. Vegh

Publications and source records attributed to Laszlo A. Vegh.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2020

Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Rado Valuations

We consider the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) while allocating a set of indivisible items to $n$ agents. The NSW is a popular objective that provides a balanced tradeoff between the often conflicting requirements of fairness and efficiency, defined as the weighted geometric mean of agents' valuations. For the symmetric additive case of the problem, where agents have the same weight with additive valuations, the first constant-factor approximation algorithm was obtained in 2015. This led to a flurry of work obtaining constant-factor approximation algorithms for the symmetric case under mild generalizations of additive, and $O(n)$-approximation algorithms for more general valuations and for the asymmetric case. In this paper, we make significant progress towards both symmetric and asymmetric NSW problems. We present the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for the symmetric case under Rado valuations. Rado valuations form a general class of valuation functions that arise from maximum cost independent matching problems, including as special cases assignment (OXS) valuations and weighted matroid rank functions. Furthermore, our approach also gives the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for the asymmetric case under Rado valuations, provided that the maximum ratio between the weights is bounded by a constant.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Strongly polynomial algorithm for a class of minimum-cost flow problems with separable convex objectives

A well-studied nonlinear extension of the minimum-cost flow problem is to minimize the objective $\sum_{ij\in E} C_{ij}(f_{ij})$ over feasible flows $f$, where on every arc $ij$ of the network, $C_{ij}$ is a convex function. We give a strongly polynomial algorithm for the case when all $C_{ij}$'s are convex quadratic functions, settling an open problem raised e.g. by Hochbaum [1994]. We also give strongly polynomial algorithms for computing market equilibria in Fisher markets with linear utilities and with spending constraint utilities, that can be formulated in this framework (see Shmyrev [2009], Devanur et al. [2011]). For the latter class this resolves an open question raised by Vazirani [2010]. The running time is $O(m^4\log m)$ for quadratic costs, $O(n^4+n^2(m+n\log n)\log n)$ for Fisher's markets with linear utilities and $O(mn^3 +m^2(m+n\log n)\log m)$ for spending constraint utilities. All these algorithms are presented in a common framework that addresses the general problem setting. Whereas it is impossible to give a strongly polynomial algorithm for the general problem even in an approximate sense (see Hochbaum [1994]), we show that assuming the existence of certain black-box oracles, one can give an algorithm using a strongly polynomial number of arithmetic operations and oracle calls only. The particular algorithms can be derived by implementing these oracles in the respective settings.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2014

The Cutting Plane Method is Polynomial for Perfect Matchings

The cutting plane approach to optimal matchings has been discussed by several authors over the past decades (e.g., Padberg and Rao '82, Grotschel and Holland '85, Lovasz and Plummer '86, Trick '87, Fischetti and Lodi '07) and its convergence has been an open question. We give a cutting plane algorithm that converges in polynomial-time using only Edmonds' blossom inequalities; it maintains half-integral intermediate LP solutions supported by a disjoint union of odd cycles and edges. Our main insight is a method to retain only a subset of the previously added cutting planes based on their dual values. This allows us to quickly find violated blossom inequalities and argue convergence by tracking the number of odd cycles in the support of intermediate solutions.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2012

Approximating Minimum-Cost k-Node Connected Subgraphs via Independence-Free Graphs

We present a 6-approximation algorithm for the minimum-cost $k$-node connected spanning subgraph problem, assuming that the number of nodes is at least $k^3(k-1)+k$. We apply a combinatorial preprocessing, based on the Frank-Tardos algorithm for $k$-outconnectivity, to transform any input into an instance such that the iterative rounding method gives a 2-approximation guarantee. This is the first constant-factor approximation algorithm even in the asymptotic setting of the problem, that is, the restriction to instances where the number of nodes is lower bounded by a function of $k$.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2012

Concave Generalized Flows with Applications to Market Equilibria

We consider a nonlinear extension of the generalized network flow model, with the flow leaving an arc being an increasing concave function of the flow entering it, as proposed by Truemper and Shigeno. We give a polynomial time combinatorial algorithm for solving corresponding flow maximization problems, finding an epsilon-approximate solution in O(m(m+log n)log(MUm/epsilon)) arithmetic operations and value oracle queries, where M and U are upper bounds on simple parameters. This also gives a new algorithm for linear generalized flows, an efficient, purely scaling variant of the Fat-Path algorithm by Goldberg, Plotkin and Tardos, not using any cycle cancellations. We show that this general convex programming model serves as a common framework for several market equilibrium problems, including the linear Fisher market model and its various extensions. Our result immediately extends these market models to more general settings. We also obtain a combinatorial algorithm for nonsymmetric Arrow-Debreu Nash bargaining, settling an open question by Vazirani.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2012

LP-based Covering Games with Low Price of Anarchy

We present a new class of vertex cover and set cover games. The price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs -- in contrast to all previously studied covering games, where the price of anarchy cannot be bounded by a constant (e.g. [6, 7, 11, 5, 2]). In particular, we describe a vertex cover game with a price of anarchy of 2. The rules of the games capture the structure of the linear programming relaxations of the underlying optimization problems, and our bounds are established by analyzing these relaxations. Furthermore, for linear costs we exhibit linear time best response dynamics that converge to these almost optimal Nash equilibria. These dynamics mimic the classical greedy approximation algorithm of Bar-Yehuda and Even [3].

cs.GT↗