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arXiv · 2203.14064

BARGAIN-MATCH: A Game Theoretical Approach for Resource Allocation and Task Offloading in Vehicular Edge Computing Networks

Zemin Sun·Geng Sun·Yanheng Liu·Jian Wang·Dongpu Cao
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Abstract

Vehicular edge computing (VEC) is emerging as a promising architecture of vehicular networks (VNs) by deploying the cloud computing resources at the edge of the VNs. This work aims to optimize resource allocation and task offloading in VEC networks. Specifically, we formulate a game theoretical resource allocation and task offloading problem (GTRATOP) that aims to maximize the system performance by jointly considering the incentive for cooperation, competition among vehicles, heterogeneity between VEC servers and vehicles, and inherent dynamic of VNs. Since the formulated GTRATOP is NP-hard, we propose an adaptive approach for resource allocation and task offloading in VEC networks by incorporating bargaining game and matching game, which is called BARGAIN-MATCH. First, for resource allocation, a bargaining game-based incentive is proposed to stimulate the vehicles and VEC servers to negotiate the optimal resource allocation and pricing decisions. Second, for task offloading, a many-to-one matching scheme is proposed to decide the optimal offloading strategies. Third, the dynamic and time-varying features are considered to adapt the strategies of BARGAIN-MATCH to the real-time VEC networks. Moreover, the BARGAIN-MATCH is proved to be stable and weak Pareto optimal. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed BARGAIN-MATCH achieves superior system performance and efficiency compared to other methods, especially when the system workload is heavy.

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Zemin Sun, Geng Sun, Yanheng Liu, Jian Wang, Dongpu Cao. 2022-03-26. BARGAIN-MATCH: A Game Theoretical Approach for Resource Allocation and Task Offloading in Vehicular Edge Computing Networks. https://doi.org/10.1109/tmc.2023.3239339

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