arXiv · 2207.14672
On Balanced Games with Infinitely Many Players: Revisiting Schmeidler's Result
Abstract
We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core understood in the space of bounded additive set functions. We show that, if a game is bounded below, then its core is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced. This finding is a generalization of Schmeidler's (1967) original result ``On Balanced Games with Infinitely Many Players'', where the game is assumed to be non-negative. We furthermore demonstrate that, if a game is not bounded below, then its core might be empty even though the game is balanced; that is, our result is tight. We also generalize Schmeidler's (1967) result to the case of restricted cooperation too.
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David Bartl, Miklós Pintér. 2022-07-29. On Balanced Games with Infinitely Many Players: Revisiting Schmeidler's Result. https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.14672
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