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arXiv · 2301.10642

Group fairness in dynamic refugee assignment

Abstract

Ensuring that refugees and asylum seekers thrive (e.g., find employment) in their host countries is a profound humanitarian goal, and a primary driver of employment is the geographic location within a host country to which the refugee or asylum seeker is assigned. Recent research has proposed and implemented algorithms that assign refugees and asylum seekers to geographic locations in a manner that maximizes the average employment across all arriving refugees. While these algorithms can have substantial overall positive impact, using data from two industry collaborators we show that the impact of these algorithms can vary widely across key subgroups based on country of origin, age, or educational background. Thus motivated, we develop a simple and interpretable framework for incorporating group fairness into the dynamic refugee assignment problem. In particular, the framework can flexibly incorporate many existing and future definitions of group fairness from the literature (e.g., Random, Proportionally Optimized within-group, and MaxMin). Equipped with our framework, we propose two bid-price algorithms that maximize overall employment while simultaneously yielding provable group fairness guarantees. Through extensive numerical experiments using various definitions of group fairness and real-world data from the U.S. and the Netherlands, we show that our algorithms can yield substantial improvements in group fairness compared to an offline benchmark fairness constraints, with only small relative decreases ($\approx$ 1%-5%) in global performance.

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BibTeXRIS

Daniel Freund, Thodoris Lykouris, Elisabeth Paulson, Bradley Sturt, Wentao Weng. 2023-01-25. Group fairness in dynamic refugee assignment. https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.10642

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