Design of Two-Level Incentive Mechanisms for Hierarchical Federated Learning

Abstract

Hierarchical Federated Learning (HFL) is a distributed machine learning paradigm tailored for multi-tiered computation architectures, which supports massive access of devices' models simultaneously. To enable efficient HFL, it is crucial to design suitable incentive mechanisms to ensure that devices actively participate in local training. However, there are few studies on incentive mechanism design for HFL. In this paper, we design two-level incentive mechanisms for the HFL with a two-tiered computing structure to encourage the participation of entities in each tier in the HFL training. In the lower-level game, we propose a coalition formation game to joint optimize the edge association and bandwidth allocation problem, and obtain efficient coalition partitions by the proposed preference rule, which can be proven to be stable by exact potential game. In the upper-level game, we design the Stackelberg game algorithm, which not only determines the optimal number of edge aggregations for edge servers to maximize their utility, but also optimize the unit reward provided for the edge aggregation performance to ensure the interests of cloud servers. Furthermore, numerical results indicate that the proposed algorithms can achieve better performance than the benchmark schemes.