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arXiv · 2309.04703

Task Freshness-aware Incentive Mechanism for Vehicle Twin Migration in Vehicular Metaverses

Jinbo Wen·Jiawen Kang·Zehui Xiong·Yang Zhang·Hongyang Du·Yutao Jiao·Dusit Niyato
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Abstract

Vehicular metaverse, which is treated as the future continuum between automotive industry and metaverse, is envisioned as a blended immersive domain as the digital twins of intelligent transportation systems. Vehicles access the vehicular metaverses by their own Vehicle Twins (VTs) (e.g., avatars) that resource-limited vehicles offload the tasks of building VTs to their nearby RoadSide Units (RSUs). However, due to the limited coverage of RSUs and the mobility of vehicles, VTs have to be migrated from one RSU to other RSUs to ensure uninterrupted metaverse services for users within vehicles. This process requires the next RSUs to contribute sufficient bandwidth resources for VT migrations under asymmetric information. To this end, in this paper, we design an efficient incentive mechanism framework for VT migrations. We first propose a novel metric named Age of Migration Task (AoMT) to quantify the task freshness of the VT migration. AoMT measures the time elapsed from the first collected sensing data of the freshest avatar migration task to the last successfully processed data at the next RSU. To incentivize the contribution of bandwidth resources among the next RSUs, we propose an AoMT-based contract model, where the optimal contract is derived to maximize the expected utility of the RSU that provides metaverse services. Numerical results demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed incentive mechanism for VT migrations.

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Jinbo Wen, Jiawen Kang, Zehui Xiong, Yang Zhang, Hongyang Du, Yutao Jiao, Dusit Niyato. 2023-09-09. Task Freshness-aware Incentive Mechanism for Vehicle Twin Migration in Vehicular Metaverses. https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.04703

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