arXiv subjects

Yutao Jiao

Publications and source records attributed to Yutao Jiao.

13 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

Optimal AoI-based Block Propagation and Incentive Mechanism for Blockchain Networks in Web 3.0

Web 3.0 is regarded as a revolutionary paradigm that enables users to securely manage data without a centralized authority. Blockchains, which enable data to be managed in a decentralized and transparent manner, are key technologies for achieving Web 3.0 goals. However, Web 3.0 based on blockchains is still in its infancy, such as ensuring block freshness and optimizing block propagation for improving blockchain performance. In this paper, we develop a freshness-aware block propagation optimization framework for Web 3.0. We first propose a novel metric called Age of Block Information (AoBI) based on the concept of age of information to quantify block freshness. AoBI measures the time elapsed from the freshest transaction generation to the completion of block consensus. To make block propagation optimization tractable, we classify miners into five different states and propose a block propagation model for public blockchains inspired by epidemic models. Moreover, considering that the miners are bounded rational, we propose an incentive mechanism based on the evolutionary game for block propagation to improve block propagation efficiency. Numerical results demonstrate that compared with other block propagation mechanisms in public blockchains, the proposed scheme has a higher block forwarding probability, which improves block propagation efficiency and decreases the minimum value of average AoBI.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Graph Attention Network-based Block Propagation with Optimal AoI and Reputation in Web 3.0

Web 3.0 is recognized as a pioneering paradigm that empowers users to securely oversee data without reliance on a centralized authority. Blockchains, as a core technology to realize Web 3.0, can facilitate decentralized and transparent data management. Nevertheless, the evolution of blockchain-enabled Web 3.0 is still in its nascent phase, grappling with challenges such as ensuring efficiency and reliability to enhance block propagation performance. In this paper, we design a Graph Attention Network (GAT)-based reliable block propagation optimization framework for blockchain-enabled Web 3.0. We first innovatively apply a data-freshness metric called age of block to measure block propagation efficiency in public blockchains. To achieve the reliability of block propagation, we introduce a reputation mechanism based on the subjective logic model, including the local and recommended opinions to calculate the miner reputation value. Moreover, considering that the GAT possesses the excellent ability to process graph-structured data, we utilize the GAT with reinforcement learning to obtain the optimal block propagation trajectory. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed scheme exhibits the most outstanding block propagation efficiency and reliability compared with traditional routing mechanisms.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Dual Auction Mechanism for Transaction Relay and Validation in Complex Wireless Blockchain Network

In traditional public blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to full nodes (i.e., miners). However, the lack of relay rewards reduces the willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the energy-constrained complex wireless network. This paper proposes a novel dual auction mechanism to allocate transaction fees for relay and validation behaviors in the wireless blockchain network. The dual auction mechanism consists of two sub-auction stages: the relay sub-auction and the validation sub-auction. In the relay sub-auction, relay nodes choose transactions based rewards to forward. Besides, relay nodes adjust the relaying probability through a no-regret algorithm to improve efficiency. In the validation sub-auction, full nodes select transactions using Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism to construct the block. We prove that the designed dual auction mechanism is Incentive Compatibility (IC), Individual Rationality (IR), and Computational Efficiency (CE). We also derive the upper bound of the social welfare difference between the social optimal auction and our proposed one. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed dual auction mechanism decreases energy and bandwidth resource consumption and effectively improves social welfare without sacrificing the throughput and the security of the wireless blockchain network.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2023

Task Freshness-aware Incentive Mechanism for Vehicle Twin Migration in Vehicular Metaverses

Vehicular metaverse, which is treated as the future continuum between automotive industry and metaverse, is envisioned as a blended immersive domain as the digital twins of intelligent transportation systems. Vehicles access the vehicular metaverses by their own Vehicle Twins (VTs) (e.g., avatars) that resource-limited vehicles offload the tasks of building VTs to their nearby RoadSide Units (RSUs). However, due to the limited coverage of RSUs and the mobility of vehicles, VTs have to be migrated from one RSU to other RSUs to ensure uninterrupted metaverse services for users within vehicles. This process requires the next RSUs to contribute sufficient bandwidth resources for VT migrations under asymmetric information. To this end, in this paper, we design an efficient incentive mechanism framework for VT migrations. We first propose a novel metric named Age of Migration Task (AoMT) to quantify the task freshness of the VT migration. AoMT measures the time elapsed from the first collected sensing data of the freshest avatar migration task to the last successfully processed data at the next RSU. To incentivize the contribution of bandwidth resources among the next RSUs, we propose an AoMT-based contract model, where the optimal contract is derived to maximize the expected utility of the RSU that provides metaverse services. Numerical results demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed incentive mechanism for VT migrations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Connectivity-Aware Contract for Incentivizing IoT Devices in Complex Wireless Blockchain

Blockchain is considered the critical backbone technology for secure and trusted Internet of Things (IoT) in the future 6G network. However, deploying a blockchain system in a complex wireless IoT network is challenging due to the limited resources, complex wireless environment, and the property of self-interested IoT devices. The existing incentive mechanism of blockchain is not compatible with the wireless IoT network. In this paper, to incentivize IoT devices to join the construction of the wireless blockchain network, we propose a multi-dimensional contract to optimize the blockchain utility while addressing the issues of adverse selection and moral hazard. Specifically, the proposed contract considers the IoT device's hash power and communication cost and especially explores the connectivity of devices from the perspective of complex network theory. We investigate the energy consumption and the block confirmation probability of the wireless blockchain network via simulations under varied network sizes and average link probability. Numerical results demonstrate that our proposed contract mechanism is feasible, achieves 35% more utility than existing approaches, and increases utility by 4 times compared with the original PoW-based incentive mechanism.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Toward an Automated Auction Framework for Wireless Federated Learning Services Market

In traditional machine learning, the central server first collects the data owners' private data together and then trains the model. However, people's concerns about data privacy protection are dramatically increasing. The emerging paradigm of federated learning efficiently builds machine learning models while allowing the private data to be kept at local devices. The success of federated learning requires sufficient data owners to jointly utilize their data, computing and communication resources for model training. In this paper, we propose an auction based market model for incentivizing data owners to participate in federated learning. We design two auction mechanisms for the federated learning platform to maximize the social welfare of the federated learning services market. Specifically, we first design an approximate strategy-proof mechanism which guarantees the truthfulness, individual rationality, and computational efficiency. To improve the social welfare, we develop an automated strategy-proof mechanism based on deep reinforcement learning and graph neural networks. The communication traffic congestion and the unique characteristics of federated learning are particularly considered in the proposed model. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our proposed auction mechanisms can efficiently maximize the social welfare and provide effective insights and strategies for the platform to organize the federated training.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Auction Mechanisms in Cloud/Fog Computing Resource Allocation for Public Blockchain Networks

As an emerging decentralized secure data management platform, blockchain has gained much popularity recently. To maintain a canonical state of blockchain data record, proof-of-work based consensus protocols provide the nodes, referred to as miners, in the network with incentives for confirming new block of transactions through a process of "block mining" by solving a cryptographic puzzle. Under the circumstance of limited local computing resources, e.g., mobile devices, it is natural for rational miners, i.e., consensus nodes, to offload computational tasks for proof of work to the cloud/fog computing servers. Therefore, we focus on the trading between the cloud/fog computing service provider and miners, and propose an auction-based market model for efficient computing resource allocation. In particular, we consider a proof-of-work based blockchain network. Due to the competition among miners in the blockchain network, the allocative externalities are particularly taken into account when designing the auction mechanisms. Specifically, we consider two bidding schemes: the constant-demand scheme where each miner bids for a fixed quantity of resources, and the multi-demand scheme where the miners can submit their preferable demands and bids. For the constant-demand bidding scheme, we propose an auction mechanism that achieves optimal social welfare. In the multi-demand bidding scheme, the social welfare maximization problem is NP-hard. Therefore, we design an approximate algorithm which guarantees the truthfulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency. Through extensive simulations, we show that our proposed auction mechanisms with the two bidding schemes can efficiently maximize the social welfare of the blockchain network and provide effective strategies for the cloud/fog computing service provider.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Mechanism Design for Wireless Powered Spatial Crowdsourcing Networks

Wireless power transfer (WPT) is a promising technology to prolong the lifetime of the sensors and communication devices, i.e., workers, in completing crowdsourcing tasks by providing continuous and cost-effective energy supplies. In this paper, we propose a wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing framework which consists of two mutually dependent phases: task allocation phase and data crowdsourcing phase. In the task allocation phase, we propose a Stackelberg game based mechanism for the spatial crowdsourcing platform to efficiently allocate spatial tasks and wireless charging power to each worker. In the data crowdsourcing phase, the workers may have an incentive to misreport its real working location to improve its utility, which causes adverse effects to the spatial crowdsourcing platform. To address this issue, we present three strategyproof deployment mechanisms for the spatial crowdsourcing platform to place a mobile base station, e.g., vehicle or robot, which is responsible for transferring the wireless power and collecting the crowdsourced data. As the benchmark, we first apply the classical median mechanism and evaluate its worst-case performance. Then, we design a conventional strategyproof deployment mechanism to improve the expected utility of the spatial crowdsourcing platform under the condition that the workers' locations follow a known geographical distribution. For a more general case with only the historical location data available, we propose a deep learning based strategyproof deployment mechanism to maximize the spatial crowdsourcing platform's utility. Extensive experimental results based on synthetic and real-world datasets reveal the effectiveness of the proposed framework in allocating tasks and charging power to workers while avoiding the dishonest worker's manipulation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Federated Learning in Mobile Edge Networks: A Comprehensive Survey

In recent years, mobile devices are equipped with increasingly advanced sensing and computing capabilities. Coupled with advancements in Deep Learning (DL), this opens up countless possibilities for meaningful applications. Traditional cloudbased Machine Learning (ML) approaches require the data to be centralized in a cloud server or data center. However, this results in critical issues related to unacceptable latency and communication inefficiency. To this end, Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) has been proposed to bring intelligence closer to the edge, where data is produced. However, conventional enabling technologies for ML at mobile edge networks still require personal data to be shared with external parties, e.g., edge servers. Recently, in light of increasingly stringent data privacy legislations and growing privacy concerns, the concept of Federated Learning (FL) has been introduced. In FL, end devices use their local data to train an ML model required by the server. The end devices then send the model updates rather than raw data to the server for aggregation. FL can serve as an enabling technology in mobile edge networks since it enables the collaborative training of an ML model and also enables DL for mobile edge network optimization. However, in a large-scale and complex mobile edge network, heterogeneous devices with varying constraints are involved. This raises challenges of communication costs, resource allocation, and privacy and security in the implementation of FL at scale. In this survey, we begin with an introduction to the background and fundamentals of FL. Then, we highlight the aforementioned challenges of FL implementation and review existing solutions. Furthermore, we present the applications of FL for mobile edge network optimization. Finally, we discuss the important challenges and future research directions in FL

cs.NI↗

arXiv2019

Task Allocation and Mobile Base Station Deployment in Wireless Powered Spatial Crowdsourcing

Wireless power transfer (WPT) is a promising technology to prolong the lifetime of sensor and communication devices, i.e., workers, in completing crowdsourcing tasks by providing continuous and cost-effective energy supplies. In this paper, we propose a wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing (SC) framework which consists of two mutual dependent phases: task allocation phase and data crowdsourcing phase. In the task allocation phase, we propose a Stackelberg game based mechanism for the SC platform to efficiently allocate spatial tasks and wireless charging power to each worker. In the data crowdsourcing phase, the workers may have an incentive to misreport its real working location to improve its own utility, which manipulates the SC platform. To address this issue, we present a strategyproof deployment mechanism for the SC platform to deploy its mobile base station. We apply the Moulin's generalized median mechanism and analyze the worst-case performance in maximizing the SC platform's utility. Finally, numerical experiments reveal the effectiveness of the proposed framework in allocating tasks and charging power to workers while avoiding the dishonest worker's manipulation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Social Welfare Maximization Auction in Edge Computing Resource Allocation for Mobile Blockchain

Blockchain, an emerging decentralized security system, has been applied in many applications, such as bitcoin, smart grid, and Internet-of-Things. However, running the mining process may cost too much energy consumption and computing resource usage on handheld devices, which restricts the use of blockchain in mobile environments. In this paper, we consider deploying edge computing service to support the mobile blockchain. We propose an auction-based edge computing resource market of the edge computing service provider. Since there is competition among miners, the allocative externalities (positive and negative) are taken into account in the model. In our auction mechanism, we maximize the social welfare while guaranteeing the truthfulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency. Based on blockchain mining experiment results, we define a hash power function that characterizes the probability of successfully mining a block. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance of our auction mechanism which shows that our edge computing resources market model can efficiently solve the social welfare maximization problem for the edge computing service provider.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Profit Maximization Auction and Data Management in Big Data Markets

A big data service is any data-originated resource that is offered over the Internet. The performance of a big data service depends on the data bought from the data collectors. However, the problem of optimal pricing and data allocation in big data services is not well-studied. In this paper, we propose an auction-based big data market model. We first define the data cost and utility based on the impact of data size on the performance of big data analytics, e.g., machine learning algorithms. The big data services are considered as digital goods and uniquely characterized with "unlimited supply" compared to conventional goods which are limited. We therefore propose a Bayesian profit maximization auction which is truthful, rational, and computationally efficient. The optimal service price and data size are obtained by solving the profit maximization auction. Finally, experimental results on a real-world taxi trip dataset show that our big data market model and auction mechanism effectively solve the profit maximization problem of the service provider.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

The Accuracy-Privacy Tradeoff of Mobile Crowdsensing

Mobile crowdsensing has emerged as an efficient sensing paradigm which combines the crowd intelligence and the sensing power of mobile devices, e.g.,~mobile phones and Internet of Things (IoT) gadgets. This article addresses the contradicting incentives of privacy preservation by crowdsensing users and accuracy maximization and collection of true data by service providers. We firstly define the individual contributions of crowdsensing users based on the accuracy in data analytics achieved by the service provider from buying their data. We then propose a truthful mechanism for achieving high service accuracy while protecting the privacy based on the user preferences. The users are incentivized to provide true data by being paid based on their individual contribution to the overall service accuracy. Moreover, we propose a coalition strategy which allows users to cooperate in providing their data under one identity, increasing their anonymity privacy protection, and sharing the resulting payoff. Finally, we outline important open research directions in mobile and people-centric crowdsensing.

cs.NI↗