arXiv · 2312.16878
Voting power in the Council of the European Union: A comprehensive sensitivity analysis
Abstract
The Council of the European Union (EU) is one of the main decision-making bodies of the EU. A number of decisions require a qualified majority, the support of 55% of the member states (currently 15) that represent at least 65% of the total population. We investigate how the power distribution based on the Shapley--Shubik index and the proportion of winning coalitions change if these criteria are modified within reasonable bounds. The power of the two countries, with approximately 4% of the total population each, is found to be almost flat. The decisiveness index decreases if the population criterion is above 68\% or the states criterion is at least 17. Some quota combinations contradict the principles of double majority. The proportion of winning coalitions can be increased from 13.2% to 20.8% (30.1%) such that the maximal relative change in the Shapley--Shubik indices remains below 3.5% (5.5%). Our results are indispensable for evaluating any proposal to reform the qualified majority voting system.
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Dóra Gréta Petróczy, László Csató. 2023-12-28. Voting power in the Council of the European Union: A comprehensive sensitivity analysis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-026-09964-1
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