arXiv · 2407.05020
A game theory analysis of decentralized epidemic management with opinion dynamics
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a static game that allows one to numerically assess the loss of efficiency induced by decentralized control or management of a global epidemic. Each player represents a region which is assumed to choose its control to implement a tradeoff between socio-economic aspects and health aspects; the control comprises both epidemic control physical measures and influence actions on the region opinion. The Generalized Nash equilibrium $(\mathrm{GNE})$ analysis of the proposed game model is conducted. The direct analysis of this game of practical interest is non-trivial but it turns out that one can construct an auxiliary game which allows one: to prove existence and uniqueness; to compute the GNE and the optimal centralized solution (sum-cost) of the game. These results allow us to assess numerically the loss (measured in terms of Price of Anarchy ($\mathrm{PoA}$)) induced by decentralization with or without taking into account the opinion dynamics.
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Olivier Lindamulage De Silva, Samson Lasaulce, Irinel-Constantin Morarescu, Vineeth S. Varma. 2024-07-06. A game theory analysis of decentralized epidemic management with opinion dynamics. https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.05020
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