arXiv · 2410.06572
Can DeepFake Speech be Reliably Detected?
Abstract
Recent advances in text-to-speech (TTS) systems, particularly those with voice cloning capabilities, have made voice impersonation readily accessible, raising ethical and legal concerns due to potential misuse for malicious activities like misinformation campaigns and fraud. While synthetic speech detectors (SSDs) exist to combat this, they are vulnerable to ``test domain shift", exhibiting decreased performance when audio is altered through transcoding, playback, or background noise. This vulnerability is further exacerbated by deliberate manipulation of synthetic speech aimed at deceiving detectors. This work presents the first systematic study of such active malicious attacks against state-of-the-art open-source SSDs. White-box attacks, black-box attacks, and their transferability are studied from both attack effectiveness and stealthiness, using both hardcoded metrics and human ratings. The results highlight the urgent need for more robust detection methods in the face of evolving adversarial threats.
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Hongbin Liu, Youzheng Chen, Arun Narayanan, Athula Balachandran, Pedro J. Moreno, Lun Wang. 2024-10-09. Can DeepFake Speech be Reliably Detected?. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.06572
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