SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2410.16857

Nash Meets Wertheimer: Using Good Continuation in Jigsaw Puzzles

Abstract

Jigsaw puzzle solving is a challenging task for computer vision since it requires high-level spatial and semantic reasoning. To solve the problem, existing approaches invariably use color and/or shape information but in many real-world scenarios, such as in archaeological fresco reconstruction, this kind of clues is often unreliable due to severe physical and pictorial deterioration of the individual fragments. This makes state-of-the-art approaches entirely unusable in practice. On the other hand, in such cases, simple geometrical patterns such as lines or curves offer a powerful yet unexplored clue. In an attempt to fill in this gap, in this paper we introduce a new challenging version of the puzzle solving problem in which one deliberately ignores conventional color and shape features and relies solely on the presence of linear geometrical patterns. The reconstruction process is then only driven by one of the most fundamental principles of Gestalt perceptual organization, namely Wertheimer's {\em law of good continuation}. In order to tackle this problem, we formulate the puzzle solving problem as the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a (noncooperative) multiplayer game and use classical multi-population replicator dynamics to solve it. The proposed approach is general and allows us to deal with pieces of arbitrary shape, size and orientation. We evaluate our approach on both synthetic and real-world data and compare it with state-of-the-art algorithms. The results show the intrinsic complexity of our purely line-based puzzle problem as well as the relative effectiveness of our game-theoretic formulation.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Marina Khoroshiltseva, Luca Palmieri, Sinem Aslan, Sebastiano Vascon, Marcello Pelillo. 2024-10-22. Nash Meets Wertheimer: Using Good Continuation in Jigsaw Puzzles. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.16857

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

MMS Allocation for Chores with Online Agent Arrivals

We study the fair allocation of $m$ indivisible chores to $n$ agents with subadditive cost functions arriving online in an arbitrary order. Upon an agent's arrival, we are informed of her cost function and must irrevocably assign her a set of chores. We focus on the Maximin Share (MMS) fairness notion and aim to compute an allocation in which all items are assigned, and no agent incurs a cost more than $\alpha$ times her MMS. Without any prior information about the instance (other than $n$ and $m$), we design an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{n, k\log^{1+\epsilon}k, \log m\})$ for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, where $k$ denotes the number of cost function types. Our bound matches the best known offline approximation guarantees for MMS under subadditive costs and is nearly optimal with respect to all three parameters: we show that even for binary additive cost functions, no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of $o(\min\{n, k\log k, \log m\})$. We then consider the setting in which the $k$ cost function types are known in advance (though the realized types of arriving agents are not). For additive cost functions, we provide an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{\log k, \log(kn)/\log\log(kn)\})$, and show that constant-competitive algorithms do not exist for general $k$, even for the binary additive setting. For binary additive functions when $k \le n$, we propose a $3$-competitive algorithm and establish a lower bound of $2$.

cs.GT

Truncated Noisy Best-Response Algorithms: Toward Game Theoretic Learning with Safety Guarantees

We consider a game theoretic approach to solve multi-agent coordination problems with submodular maximization objectives. It is known for such problems that the Nash equilibria for the corresponding game are always within 50% of the optimal, but that the equilibria which achieve this worst-case bound are not stable. To exploit this instability, we propose a family of algorithms which we call Truncated Noisy Best-Response (TNBR) Algorithms. These algorithms are flexibly characterized by agents asynchronously and stochastically selecting actions from a neighbourhood of their best response payoffs. We compute bounds on the recurrent classes of TNBR algorithms' associated Markov chains. Our bounds fall into two categories: first, "Performance" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms always have a high-value recurrent state; second, "Safety" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms never have arbitrarily-bad recurrent states. Furthermore, these two types of bounds are linked by a waterbed-like effect: every game with a poor Safety guarantee necessarily has a favorable Performance guarantee.

cs.GT

Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections

We settle the main open question in the theory of approval-based multi-winner elections: we show that there always exists a committee in the core. The core is a stability and group fairness concept. The proof introduces a new voting rule that optimizes an entropy-like objective function over committees and payment systems. All local optima of this objective function lie in the core, which implies that a core committee can be found in polynomial time.

cs.GT