From misinformation to climate crisis: Navigating vulnerabilities in the cyber-physical-social systems

Tooba Aamir; Marthie Grobler; Giovanni Russello

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arXiv · 2510.13058

From misinformation to climate crisis: Navigating vulnerabilities in the cyber-physical-social systems

Tooba Aamir·Marthie Grobler·Giovanni Russello

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Abstract

Within the cyber-physical-social-climate nexus, all systems are deeply interdependent: cyber infrastructure facilitates communication, data processing, and automation across physical systems (such as power grids and networks), while social infrastructure provides the human capital and societal norms necessary for the system's functionality. Any disruption within any of these components, whether due to human error or system mismanagement, can propagate throughout the network, amplifying vulnerabilities and creating a significantly scaled impact. This chapter explores the critical role of human vulnerabilities within the cyber-physical-social-climate nexus, focusing on the interdependencies across cyber, physical, and social systems and how these interdependencies can scale in a climate context. While cyber and physical vulnerabilities are readily apparent, social vulnerabilities (such as misinformation, resistance to policy change, and lack of public awareness) often go unaddressed despite their profound impact on resilience and climate adaptation. Social infrastructure, including human capital, societal norms, and policy frameworks, shapes community responses and underpins adaptive capacity, yet it is also a significant point of failure when overlooked. This chapter examines how human cognitive biases, risk misperception, and decision-making silos within interconnected systems can lead to resource misallocation and weakened policy effectiveness. These factors are analyzed to demonstrate how inadequate responses across cyber-physical-social layers can cascade, amplifying climate-related risks. By addressing these human factors and aligning decision-making frameworks, we aim to strengthen resilience and foster cohesive adaptation strategies that account for the intricate interrelations of cyber-physical-social-climate systems.

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Tooba Aamir, Marthie Grobler, Giovanni Russello. 2025-10-15. From misinformation to climate crisis: Navigating vulnerabilities in the cyber-physical-social systems. https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.13058

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