Ignorance as an excuse, formally

Ekaterina Kubyshkina; Marcio Kléos Pereira; Mattia Petrolo

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arXiv · 2511.02942

Ignorance as an excuse, formally

Ekaterina Kubyshkina·Marcio Kléos Pereira·Mattia Petrolo

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Abstract

There is a lively debate in the current literature on epistemology on which type of ignorance may provide a moral excuse. A good candidate is the one in which an agent has never thought about or considered as true a proposition $p$. From a logical perspective, it is usual to model situations involving ignorance by means of epistemic logic. However, no formal analysis has been provided for ignorance as an excuse. We fill this gap by proposing an original logical setting for modelling this type of ignorance. In particular, we introduce a complete and sound logic in which excusable ignorance is expressed as a primitive modality. This logic is characterized by Kripke semantics with possibly incomplete worlds. Moreover, to consider the conditions of a possible change of an agent's ignorance, we will extend the setting to public announcement logic equipped with a novel update procedure.

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BibTeX RIS

Ekaterina Kubyshkina, Marcio Kléos Pereira, Mattia Petrolo. 2025-11-04. Ignorance as an excuse, formally. https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.02942

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