arXiv · 2512.09450
Adaptive Punishment in Social Dilemmas
Abstract
We introduce a coevolutionary framework in which punishment intensity dynamically adapts to the fraction of cooperators in the population. Unlike static models, adaptive punishment reshapes the effective payoff landscape, driving transitions among canonical games, including the Prisoner's Dilemma, Harmony, Stag Hunt, and Chicken games. Analytical results reveal rich dynamical behaviors such as coexistence, bistability, limit cycle and Hopf bifurcation. These findings highlight adaptive punishment as a robust mechanism for sustaining cooperation by the coevolutionary feedback and offer insights into institutional design, ecological interactions, and social governance.
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Xingfu Ke, Hao Yu, Xiao-Pu Han, Yi-Cheng Zhang, Fanyuan Meng. 2025-12-10. Adaptive Punishment in Social Dilemmas. https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.09450
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