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Xingfu Ke

Publications and source records attributed to Xingfu Ke.

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Exact log-odds representation and mean-field criticality of a growing social group model

We present an exact analytical reformulation of a growing social group model -- a Hamiltonian-free nonequilibrium process in which a group grows by noisy, consensus-driven admission. Cast as a gradient flow on logarithmic time, the fixed-point structure collapses to a single self-consistent equation: $\arctanh(\phi^*) = m \cdot \arctanh(\alpha\phi^*)$, where $\phi$ is the polarization, $\alpha=1-2\eta$ the evaluation reliability, and $m$ the number of evaluators. The equation has a direct log-odds interpretation: each verdict contributes log-likelihood ratio $2\arctanh(\alpha\phi)$; unanimity accumulates $m$ independent evidence pieces. The dynamics thus constitutes an exact mean-field theory of self-consistent inference, ordering when the collective gain $m\alpha$ overcomes the dilution of growth. We develop a systematic three-layer framework: core theory (Landau-like effective potential, comparison with the mean-field Ising model, and features without equilibrium counterpart), mathematical foundations (criticality from correlated verdicts, P\'{o}lya-urn martingale convergence, and an RG-like flow with group size as scale), and complementary perspectives on irreversibility and information geometry. A frozen-$N$ Freidlin--Wentzell quasipotential yields Kramers-type escape estimates for metastable states, while Monte Carlo simulations collapse onto a parameter-free deterministic master curve on logarithmic time. Systematic comparison with the mean-field Ising model reveals shared critical exponents but a nested arctanh structure unique to growth. These results provide a detailed analytical characterization of a minimal model of growth-driven collective behavior and map which elements of the equilibrium critical toolbox -- suitably reinterpreted -- survive without a Hamiltonian.

cond-mat.stat-mech

Adaptive Punishment in Social Dilemmas

We introduce a coevolutionary framework in which punishment intensity dynamically adapts to the fraction of cooperators in the population. Unlike static models, adaptive punishment reshapes the effective payoff landscape, driving transitions among canonical games, including the Prisoner's Dilemma, Harmony, Stag Hunt, and Chicken games. Analytical results reveal rich dynamical behaviors such as coexistence, bistability, limit cycle and Hopf bifurcation. These findings highlight adaptive punishment as a robust mechanism for sustaining cooperation by the coevolutionary feedback and offer insights into institutional design, ecological interactions, and social governance.

physics.soc-ph