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arXiv · 2512.18444

Snowveil: A Framework for Decentralised Preference Discovery

Grammateia Kotsialou
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Abstract

Aggregating subjective preferences in social choice traditionally assumes a trusted central authority. In contrast, this paper formalises Decentralised Preference Discovery (DPD): the reliable identification of a social choice parameter (e.g. the canonical outcome of an aggregation rule applied to the global preference profile) under conditions of partial information, asynchronous interaction, censorship resistance, and no central coordinator. To address DPD, we propose Snowveil, a gossip-based framework where agents repeatedly sample random peer rankings and update local beliefs to converge on the canonical outcome. Using a potential function, submartingale theory, and concentration bounds, we prove the system reaches this stable state with tunable high probability, in finite expected time. This single-winner process can then be iterated to construct a set of winning candidates for multi-winner scenarios. Snowveil is agnostic to specific aggregation rules, requiring only that the rule satisfies axioms such as Positive Responsiveness, thus offering a formal basis for a wider class of DPD protocols. Demonstrating Snowveil's modularity, we introduce the Constrained Hybrid Borda (CHB), an aggregation rule designed to balance broad consensus with plurality support. We provide an axiomatic analysis of CHB and present empirical results via extensive simulation, validating Snowveil's O(n) scalability. Overall, this work provides a foundation for how a stable consensus emerges from subjective, expressive, and diverse preference profiles in large-scale decentralised systems.

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BibTeXRIS

Grammateia Kotsialou. 2025-12-20. Snowveil: A Framework for Decentralised Preference Discovery. https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.18444

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