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arXiv · 2601.19435

Ad Insertion in LLM-Generated Responses

Abstract

Sustainable monetization of large language models (LLMs) remains a critical open challenge. Traditional search advertising, which relies on static keywords, fails to capture the fleeting, context-dependent user intent---the specific information, goods, or services a user seeks---embedded in conversational flows. Beyond the standard goal of social welfare maximization effective LLM advertising requires contextual coherence (aligning ads semantically with transient user intent), computational efficiency (avoiding user-facing latency), and adherence to ethical and regulatory standards, including privacy preservation and explicit ad disclosure. Although recent solutions have explored bidding at the token and query levels, neither category holistically satisfies these constraints. We propose a framework that resolves these tensions through two decoupling strategies. First, we decouple ad insertion from response generation to facilitate pre-screening and explicit disclosure. Second, we decouple bidding from specific user queries by using ``genres'' (high-level semantic clusters) as a proxy. This allows advertisers to bid on stable categories rather than sensitive real-time responses, reducing computational burden and privacy risks. Applying the VCG auction mechanism to this genre-based framework provides approximate guarantees for dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC), individual rationality (IR), and social welfare. In synthetic experiments with $10^5$ advertisers and 100 candidate slots, VCG clears in approximately 1.25 seconds on a consumer-grade laptop. Finally, we introduce an ``LLM-as-a-Judge'' metric for estimating contextual coherence. Its predictions correlate with mean human ratings at Spearman's $\rho\approx 0.66$ and have a higher correlation with the leave-one-out group mean than 29 of 36 individual raters (80.6\%).

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BibTeXRIS

Shengwei Xu, Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Zhiyi Huang, Grant Schoenebeck. 2026-01-27. Ad Insertion in LLM-Generated Responses. https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.19435

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