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arXiv · 2601.23126

Greedy Routing Reachability Games

Pascal Lenzner·Paraskevi Machaira
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Abstract

Today's networks consist of many autonomous entities that follow their own objectives, i.e., smart devices or parts of large AI systems, that are interconnected. Given the size and complexity of most communication networks, each entity typically only has a local view and thus must rely on a local routing protocol for sending and forwarding packets. A common solution for this is greedy routing, where packets are locally forwarded to a neighbor in the network that is closer to the packet's destination. In this paper we investigate a game-theoretic model with autonomous agents that aim at forming a network where greedy routing is enabled. The agents are positioned in a metric space and each agent tries to establish as few links as possible, while maintaining that it can reach every other agent via greedy routing. Thus, this model captures how greedy routing networks are formed without any assumption on the distribution of the agents or the specific employed greedy routing protocol. Hence, it distills the essence that makes greedy routing work. We study two variants of the model: with directed edges or with undirected edges. For the former, we show that equilibria exist, have optimal total cost, and that in Euclidean metrics they can be found efficiently. However, even for this simple setting computing optimal strategies is NP-hard. For the much more challenging setting with undirected edges, we show for the realistic setting with agents in 2D Euclidean space that the price of anarchy is between 1.75 and 1.8 and for higher dimensions it is less than 2. Also, we show that best response dynamics may cycle, but that in Euclidean space almost optimal approximate equilibria can be computed in polynomial time. Moreover, for 2D Euclidean space, these approximate equilibria outperform the well-known Delaunay triangulation.

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Pascal Lenzner, Paraskevi Machaira. 2026-01-30. Greedy Routing Reachability Games. https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.23126

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