arXiv · 2602.00606
Actor-Dual-Critic Dynamics for Zero-sum and Identical-Interest Stochastic Games
Abstract
We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.
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Ahmed Said Donmez, Yuksel Arslantas, Muhammed O. Sayin. 2026-01-31. Actor-Dual-Critic Dynamics for Zero-sum and Identical-Interest Stochastic Games. https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.00606
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