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arXiv · 2602.04073

Incompleteness in Quantified Conditional Logic

Abstract

Stalnaker and Thomason famously proved that the conditional logic \textsf{C2} with first-order quantifiers is complete with respect to a selection function semantics. However, the selection functions used in this completeness result take formulas, rather than propositions (i.e., sets of worlds), as arguments. Yet Stalnaker has repeatedly emphasized the philosophical importance of viewing selection functions as functions on propositions, and many of the applications of his theory require this. Can their completeness result be extended to a selection function semantics in which the functions take propositions as arguments? We prove the answer is negative: Their logic is frame incomplete. Moreover, this result is invariant with respect to many choice points regarding the semantics, such as variable vs.~constant domains or whether to include an identity or existence predicate. We conclude by discussing some of the important and difficult questions for the philosophical and logical study of conditionals that our results raise.

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BibTeXRIS

Alexander W. Kocurek, James Walsh, Yale Weiss. 2026-02-03. Incompleteness in Quantified Conditional Logic. https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.04073

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