STARDIS: Strategic Scheduling and Deceptive Signaling for Satellite Intrusion Detection System Deployment

Abstract

Satellite communication networks operate under stringent computational constraints and are susceptible to sophisticated cyberattacks. This paper introduces a novel defense framework that decouples security optimization into ground-based analysis and onboard real-time execution. In the long-term loop, the ground segment processes historical data to estimate key statistical parameters of the task environment. Additionally, we incorporate the time-varying characteristics of satellite wireless links to account for the dynamic communication context. In the short-term loop, the satellite employs a receding horizon optimization that models dynamic task arrivals and maximizes a utility function considering detection rates and resource costs. To counter intelligent adversaries interception, we introduce a deception mechanism using Bayesian persuasion theory. By strategically manipulating the short-term action sequences in the telemetry downlink, we mislead an external attacker's beliefs. We mathematically model the attacker's optimal response under channel uncertainty and demonstrate that our framework significantly reduces attacker utility. The approach's effectiveness is formally proven using Lyapunov theory.