arXiv subjects

Linan Huang

Publications and source records attributed to Linan Huang.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

A Consolidated Game Framework for Cooperative Defense Against Cross-Domain Cyber Attacks in Satellite-Enabled Internet of Things

As the adoption of satellite-enabled Internet of Things (IoT) continues to rise, its intricate multidomain architecture becomes increasingly susceptible to cross-domain cyber threats. Attackers can exploit compromised IoT devices, inject malicious packets into data streams aggregated at the IoT gateway for satellite backhaul, and potentially endanger the satellite network during transmission by exploiting the hardware, software, and protocol vulnerabilities. Compared to single-domain defenses, cooperative defense at the IoT devices, IoT access network, and satellite transmission network provides fine-granularity defense against cross-domain intelligent attacks. However, quantifying cross-domain impacts and tilting incentive misalignment among different participants remain significant challenges, making systematic cooperative defense development a complex task. To address this, we develop a tripartite security game framework to characterize the impacts of attacks and defense methods across both the terrestrial and satellite domains. Leveraging this game model, we devise flow pricing to optimally motivate the IoT network operator (IoT-NO) to prevent malicious packet infiltration into the satellite domain. Subsequently, we propose efficient learning algorithms enabling both the IoT-NO to ascertain their ideal flow sampling strategies and the satellite service provider (SAT-SP) to determine optimal flow pricing. The simulation results corroborate the effectiveness of the consolidated game in counteracting cross-domain cyber attacks and facilitating cooperative defense between the IoT-NO and the SAT-SP with nonaligned incentives.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Toward Secure Operation and Management (O&M) of Satellite Constellations: Efficiency, Resilience, and Reliability in a Network Perspective

Satellite constellations equipped with Inter-Satellite Links and onboard packet switching enable real-time Operation and Management across globally distributed satellites, but also broaden the attack surface and introduce unprecedented cybersecurity threats. Existing efforts mainly focus on cryptography for single-satellite point-to-point links, without considering constellation-level security. To address this gap, this article extends security research in two directions: from individual satellites to constellation-wide architectures, and from isolated cryptography to system-level security incorporating efficiency, resilience, and reliability. These extensions raise three key questions: how to design efficient security mechanisms for dynamic constellation topologies with adaptive onboard routing; how a constellation O&M system can recover resiliently under worst-case failures of onboard security functions; and how to improve the reliability of onboard security functions under stringent resource constraints. To address these challenges, we first construct a constellation-wide hybrid security framework that protects semantically sensitive content fields using End-to-End encryption, while safeguarding routing-related fields through Moving Target Defense. Next, we introduce a ciphered-mode and safe-mode management mechanism with an M-delayed fallback that balances recovery timeliness and exploitability. Finally, we propose security-aware routers that manage plaintext/ciphered modes and coordinate access to a shared pool of onboard cipher modules, enabling redundancy sharing across multiple endpoints and extending secure operation duration in ciphered mode. These solutions comply with existing standards defined by organizations including DVB and the CCSDS, while translating conceptual security principles into practical system-level mechanisms.

cs.CE↗

arXiv2026

STARDIS: Strategic Scheduling and Deceptive Signaling for Satellite Intrusion Detection System Deployment

Satellite communication networks operate under stringent computational constraints and are susceptible to sophisticated cyberattacks. This paper introduces a novel defense framework that decouples security optimization into ground-based analysis and onboard real-time execution. In the long-term loop, the ground segment processes historical data to estimate key statistical parameters of the task environment. Additionally, we incorporate the time-varying characteristics of satellite wireless links to account for the dynamic communication context. In the short-term loop, the satellite employs a receding horizon optimization that models dynamic task arrivals and maximizes a utility function considering detection rates and resource costs. To counter intelligent adversaries interception, we introduce a deception mechanism using Bayesian persuasion theory. By strategically manipulating the short-term action sequences in the telemetry downlink, we mislead an external attacker's beliefs. We mathematically model the attacker's optimal response under channel uncertainty and demonstrate that our framework significantly reduces attacker utility. The approach's effectiveness is formally proven using Lyapunov theory.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

An Introduction of System-Scientific Approaches to Cognitive Security

Human cognitive capacities and the needs of human-centric solutions for "Industry 5.0" make humans an indispensable component in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), referred to as Human-Cyber-Physical Systems (HCPSs), where AI-powered technologies are incorporated to assist and augment humans. The close integration between humans and technologies in Section 1.1 and cognitive attacks in Section 1.2.4 poses emerging security challenges, where attacks can exploit vulnerabilities of human cognitive processes, affect their behaviors, and ultimately damage the HCPS. Defending HCPSs against cognitive attacks requires a new security paradigm, which we refer to as "cognitive security" in Section 1.2.5. The vulnerabilities of human cognitive systems and the associated methods of exploitation distinguish cognitive security from "cognitive reliability" and give rise to a distinctive CIA triad, as shown in Sections 1.2.5.1 and 1.2.5.2, respectively. Section 1.2.5.3 introduces cognitive and technical defense methods that deter the kill chain of cognitive attacks and achieve cognitive security. System scientific perspectives in Section 1.3 offer a promising direction to address the new challenges of cognitive security by developing quantitative, modular, multi-scale, and transferable solutions.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

ZETAR: Modeling and Computational Design of Strategic and Adaptive Compliance Policies

Compliance management plays an important role in mitigating insider threats. Incentive design is a proactive and non-invasive approach to achieving compliance by aligning an insider's incentive with the defender's security objective, which motivates (rather than commands) an insider to act in the organization's interests. Controlling insiders' incentives for population-level compliance is challenging because they are neither precisely known nor directly controllable. To this end, we develop ZETAR, a zero-trust audit and recommendation framework, to provide a quantitative approach to model insiders' incentives and design customized recommendation policies to improve their compliance. We formulate primal and dual convex programs to compute the optimal bespoke recommendation policies. We create the theoretical underpinning for understanding trust, compliance, and satisfaction, which leads to scoring mechanisms of how compliant and persuadable an insider is. After classifying insiders as malicious, self-interested, or amenable based on their incentive misalignment levels with the defender, we establish bespoke information disclosure principles for these insiders of different incentive categories. We identify the policy separability principle and the set convexity, which enable finite-step algorithms to efficiently learn the Completely Trustworthy (CT) policy set when insiders' incentives are unknown. Finally, we present a case study to corroborate the design. Our results show that ZETAR can well adapt to insiders with different risk and compliance attitudes and significantly improve compliance. Moreover, trustworthy recommendations can provably promote cyber hygiene and insiders' satisfaction.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

RADAMS: Resilient and Adaptive Alert and Attention Management Strategy against Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) Attacks

Attacks exploiting human attentional vulnerability have posed severe threats to cybersecurity. In this work, we identify and formally define a new type of proactive attentional attacks called Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) attacks that generate a large volume of feint attacks to overload human operators and hide real attacks among feints. We incorporate human factors (e.g., levels of expertise, stress, and efficiency) and empirical psychological results (e.g., the Yerkes-Dodson law and the sunk cost fallacy) to model the operators' attention dynamics and their decision-making processes along with the real-time alert monitoring and inspection. To assist human operators in dismissing the feints and escalating the real attacks timely and accurately, we develop a Resilient and Adaptive Data-driven alert and Attention Management Strategy (RADAMS) that de-emphasizes alerts selectively based on the abstracted category labels of the alerts. RADAMS uses reinforcement learning to achieve a customized and transferable design for various human operators and evolving IDoS attacks. The integrated modeling and theoretical analysis lead to the Product Principle of Attention (PPoA), fundamental limits, and the tradeoff among crucial human and economic factors. Experimental results corroborate that the proposed strategy outperforms the default strategy and can reduce the IDoS risk by as much as 20%. Besides, the strategy is resilient to large variations of costs, attack frequencies, and human attention capacities. We have recognized interesting phenomena such as attentional risk equivalency, attacker's dilemma, and the half-truth optimal attack strategy.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Combating Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) Attacks: Modeling and Mitigation of Attentional Human Vulnerability

This work proposes a new class of proactive attacks called the Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) attacks that exploit the attentional human vulnerability. By generating a large volume of feints, IDoS attacks deplete the cognitive resources of human operators to prevent humans from identifying the real attacks hidden among feints. This work aims to formally define IDoS attacks, quantify their consequences, and develop human-assistive security technologies to mitigate the severity level and risks of IDoS attacks. To this end, we use the semi-Markov process to model the sequential arrivals of feints and real attacks with category labels attached in the associated alerts. The assistive technology strategically manages human attention by highlighting selective alerts periodically to prevent the distraction of other alerts. A data-driven approach is applied to evaluate human performance under different Attention Management (AM) strategies. Under a representative special case, we establish the computational equivalency between two dynamic programming representations to reduce the computation complexity and enable online learning with samples of reduced size and zero delays. A case study corroborates the effectiveness of the learning framework. The numerical results illustrate how AM strategies can alleviate the severity level and the risk of IDoS attacks. Furthermore, the results show that the minimum risk is achieved with a proper level of intentional inattention to alerts, which we refer to as the law of rational risk-reduction inattention.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Reinforcement Learning for Feedback-Enabled Cyber Resilience

Digitization and remote connectivity have enlarged the attack surface and made cyber systems more vulnerable. As attackers become increasingly sophisticated and resourceful, mere reliance on traditional cyber protection, such as intrusion detection, firewalls, and encryption, is insufficient to secure the cyber systems. Cyber resilience provides a new security paradigm that complements inadequate protection with resilience mechanisms. A Cyber-Resilient Mechanism (CRM) adapts to the known or zero-day threats and uncertainties in real-time and strategically responds to them to maintain critical functions of the cyber systems in the event of successful attacks. Feedback architectures play a pivotal role in enabling the online sensing, reasoning, and actuation process of the CRM. Reinforcement Learning (RL) is an essential tool that epitomizes the feedback architectures for cyber resilience. It allows the CRM to provide sequential responses to attacks with limited or without prior knowledge of the environment and the attacker. In this work, we review the literature on RL for cyber resilience and discuss cyber resilience against three major types of vulnerabilities, i.e., posture-related, information-related, and human-related vulnerabilities. We introduce three application domains of CRMs: moving target defense, defensive cyber deception, and assistive human security technologies. The RL algorithms also have vulnerabilities themselves. We explain the three vulnerabilities of RL and present attack models where the attacker targets the information exchanged between the environment and the agent: the rewards, the state observations, and the action commands. We show that the attacker can trick the RL agent into learning a nefarious policy with minimum attacking effort. Lastly, we discuss the future challenges of RL for cyber security and resilience and emerging applications of RL-based CRMs.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

ADVERT: An Adaptive and Data-Driven Attention Enhancement Mechanism for Phishing Prevention

Attacks exploiting the innate and the acquired vulnerabilities of human users have posed severe threats to cybersecurity. This work proposes ADVERT, a human-technical solution that generates adaptive visual aids in real-time to prevent users from inadvertence and reduce their susceptibility to phishing attacks. Based on the eye-tracking data, we extract visual states and attention states as system-level sufficient statistics to characterize the user's visual behaviors and attention status. By adopting a data-driven approach and two learning feedback of different time scales, this work lays out a theoretical foundation to analyze, evaluate, and particularly modify humans' attention processes while they vet and recognize phishing emails. We corroborate the effectiveness, efficiency, and robustness of ADVERT through a case study based on the data set collected from human subject experiments conducted at New York University. The results show that the visual aids can statistically increase the attention level and improve the accuracy of phishing recognition from 74.6% to a minimum of 86%. The meta-adaptation can further improve the accuracy to 91.5% (resp. 93.7%) in less than 3 (resp. 50) tuning stages.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2021

Convergence of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Bayesian Games under Discretization

We prove the existence of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of general-sum Bayesian games with continuous types and finite actions under the conditions that the utility functions and the prior type distributions are continuous concerning the players' types. Moreover, there exists a sequence of discretized Bayesian games whose BNE strategies converge weakly to a BNE strategy of the infinite Bayesian game. Our proof establishes a connection between the equilibria of the infinite Bayesian game and those of finite approximations, which leads to an algorithm to construct $\varepsilon$-BNE of infinite Bayesian games by discretizing players' type spaces.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Farsighted Risk Mitigation of Lateral Movement Using Dynamic Cognitive Honeypots

Lateral movement of advanced persistent threats has posed a severe security challenge. Due to the stealthy and persistent nature of the lateral movement, defenders need to consider time and spatial locations holistically to discover latent attack paths across a large time-scale and achieve long-term security for the target assets. In this work, we propose a time-expanded random network to model the stochastic service links in the user-host enterprise network and the adversarial lateral movement. We design cognitive honeypots at idle production nodes and disguise honey links as service links to detect and deter the adversarial lateral movement. The location of the honeypot changes randomly at different times and increases the honeypots' stealthiness. Since the defender does not know whether, when, and where the initial intrusion and the lateral movement occur, the honeypot policy aims to reduce the target assets' Long-Term Vulnerability (LTV) for proactive and persistent protection. We further characterize three tradeoffs, i.e., the probability of interference, the stealthiness level, and the roaming cost. To counter the curse of multiple attack paths, we propose an iterative algorithm and approximate the LTV with the union bound for computationally efficient deployment of cognitive honeypots. The results of the vulnerability analysis illustrate the bounds, trends, and a residue of LTV when the adversarial lateral movement has infinite duration. Besides honeypot policies, we obtain a critical threshold of compromisability to guide the design and modification of the current system parameters for a higher level of long-term security. We show that the target node can achieve zero vulnerability under infinite stages of lateral movement if the probability of movement deterrence is not less than the threshold.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2020

Duplicity Games for Deception Design with an Application to Insider Threat Mitigation

Recent incidents such as the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack and the SolarWinds hack have shown that traditional defense techniques are becoming insufficient to deter adversaries of growing sophistication. Proactive and deceptive defenses are an emerging class of methods to defend against zero-day and advanced attacks. This work develops a new game-theoretic framework called the duplicity game to design deception mechanisms that consist of a generator, an incentive modulator, and a trust manipulator, referred to as the GMM mechanism. We formulate a mathematical programming problem to compute the optimal GMM mechanism, quantify the upper limit of enforceable security policies, and characterize conditions on user's identifiability and manageability for cyber attribution and user management. We develop a separation principle that decouples the design of the modulator from the GMM mechanism and an equivalence principle that turns the joint design of the generator and the manipulator into the single design of the manipulator. A case study of dynamic honeypot configurations is presented to mitigate insider threats. The numerical experiments corroborate the results that the optimal GMM mechanism can elicit desirable actions from both selfish and adversarial insiders and consequently improve the security posture of the insider network. In particular, a proper modulator can reduce the \textcolor{black}{incentive misalignment} between the players and achieve win-win situations for the selfish insider and the defender. Meanwhile, we observe that the defender always benefits from faking the percentage of honeypots when the optimal generator is presented.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Dynamic Games for Secure and Resilient Control System Design

Modern control systems are featured by their hierarchical structure composing of cyber, physical, and human layers. The intricate dependencies among multiple layers and units of modern control systems require an integrated framework to address cross-layer design issues related to security and resilience challenges. To this end, game theory provides a bottom-up modeling paradigm to capture the strategic interactions among multiple components of the complex system and enables a holistic view to understand and design cyber-physical-human control systems. In this review, we first provide a multi-layer perspective toward increasingly complex and integrated control systems and then introduce several variants of dynamic games for modeling different layers of control systems. We present game-theoretic methods for understanding the fundamental tradeoffs of robustness, security, and resilience and developing a clean-slate cross-layer approach to enhance the system performance in various adversarial environments. This review also includes three quintessential research problems that represent three research directions where dynamic game approaches can bridge between multiple research areas and make significant contributions to the design of modern control systems. The paper is concluded with a discussion on emerging areas of research that crosscut dynamic games and control systems.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2019

Strategic Learning for Active, Adaptive, and Autonomous Cyber Defense

The increasing instances of advanced attacks call for a new defense paradigm that is active, autonomous, and adaptive, named as the \texttt{`3A'} defense paradigm. This chapter introduces three defense schemes that actively interact with attackers to increase the attack cost and gather threat information, i.e., defensive deception for detection and counter-deception, feedback-driven Moving Target Defense (MTD), and adaptive honeypot engagement. Due to the cyber deception, external noise, and the absent knowledge of the other players' behaviors and goals, these schemes possess three progressive levels of information restrictions, i.e., from the parameter uncertainty, the payoff uncertainty, to the environmental uncertainty. To estimate the unknown and reduce uncertainty, we adopt three different strategic learning schemes that fit the associated information restrictions. All three learning schemes share the same feedback structure of sensation, estimation, and actions so that the most rewarding policies get reinforced and converge to the optimal ones in autonomous and adaptive fashions. This work aims to shed lights on proactive defense strategies, lay a solid foundation for strategic learning under incomplete information, and quantify the tradeoff between the security and costs.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

A Dynamic Game Framework for Rational and Persistent Robot Deception With an Application to Deceptive Pursuit-Evasion

This article studies rational and persistent deception among intelligent robots to enhance security and operational efficiency. We present an N-player K-stage game with an asymmetric information structure where each robot's private information is modeled as a random variable or its type. The deception is persistent as each robot's private type remains unknown to other robots for all stages. The deception is rational as robots aim to achieve their deception goals at minimum cost. Each robot forms a dynamic belief of others' types based on intrinsic or extrinsic information. Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) is a natural solution concept for dynamic games of incomplete information. Due to its requirements of sequential rationality and belief consistency, PBNE provides a reliable prediction of players' actions, beliefs, and expected cumulative costs over the entire K stages. The contribution of this work is fourfold. First, we identify the PBNE computation as a nonlinear stochastic control problem and characterize the structures of players' actions and costs under PBNE. We further derive a set of extended Riccati equations with cognitive coupling under the linear-quadratic (LQ) setting and extrinsic belief dynamics. Second, we develop a receding-horizon algorithm with low temporal and spatial complexity to compute PBNE under intrinsic belief dynamics. Third, we investigate a deceptive pursuit-evasion game as a case study and use numerical experiments to corroborate the results. Finally, we propose metrics, such as deceivability, reachability, and the price of deception (PoD), to evaluate the strategy design and the system performance under deception.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2019

Adaptive Honeypot Engagement through Reinforcement Learning of Semi-Markov Decision Processes

A honeynet is a promising active cyber defense mechanism. It reveals the fundamental Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) by luring attackers to conduct adversarial behaviors in a controlled and monitored environment. The active interaction at the honeynet brings a high reward but also introduces high implementation costs and risks of adversarial honeynet exploitation. In this work, we apply infinite-horizon Semi-Markov Decision Process (SMDP) to characterize a stochastic transition and sojourn time of attackers in the honeynet and quantify the reward-risk trade-off. In particular, we design adaptive long-term engagement policies shown to be risk-averse, cost-effective, and time-efficient. Numerical results have demonstrated that our adaptive engagement policies can quickly attract attackers to the target honeypot and engage them for a sufficiently long period to obtain worthy threat information. Meanwhile, the penetration probability is kept at a low level. The results show that the expected utility is robust against attackers of a large range of persistence and intelligence. Finally, we apply reinforcement learning to the SMDP to solve the curse of modeling. Under a prudent choice of the learning rate and exploration policy, we achieve a quick and robust convergence of the optimal policy and value.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

A Dynamic Games Approach to Proactive Defense Strategies against Advanced Persistent Threats in Cyber-Physical Systems

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have recently emerged as a significant security challenge for a cyber-physical system due to their stealthy, dynamic and adaptive nature. Proactive dynamic defenses provide a strategic and holistic security mechanism to increase the costs of attacks and mitigate the risks. This work proposes a dynamic game framework to model a long-term interaction between a stealthy attacker and a proactive defender. The stealthy and deceptive behaviors are captured by the multi-stage game of incomplete information, where each player has his own private information unknown to the other. Both players act strategically according to their beliefs which are formed by the multi-stage observation and learning. The perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium provides a useful prediction of both players' policies because no players benefit from unilateral deviations from the equilibrium. We propose an iterative algorithm to compute the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and use the Tennessee Eastman process as a benchmark case study. Our numerical experiment corroborates the analytical results and provides further insights into the design of proactive defense-in-depth strategies.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Deception: Evidence-Based Strategies and Dynamic Risk Mitigation

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions between the players and quantitatively characterizes the conflicting incentives and strategic responses. In this chapter, we provide an overview of deception games in three different environments and extend the baseline signaling game models to include evidence through side-channel knowledge acquisition to capture the information asymmetry, dynamics, and strategic behaviors of deception. We analyze the deception in binary information space based on a signaling game framework with a detector that gives off probabilistic evidence of the deception when the sender acts deceptively. We then focus on a class of continuous one-dimensional information space and take into account the cost of deception in the signaling game. We finally explore the multi-stage incomplete-information Bayesian game model for defensive deception for advanced persistent threats (APTs). We use the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) as the solution concept for the deception games and analyze the strategic equilibrium behaviors for both the deceivers and the deceivees.

cs.CR↗