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arXiv · 2603.21532

Stationary Online Contention Resolution Schemes

Abstract

Online contention resolution schemes (OCRSs) are a central tool in Bayesian online selection and resource allocation: they convert fractional ex-ante relaxations into feasible online policies while preserving each marginal probability up to a constant factor. Despite their importance, designing (near) optimal OCRSs is often technically challenging, and many existing constructions rely on indirect reductions to prophet inequalities and LP duality, resulting in algorithms that are difficult to interpret or implement. In this paper, we introduce "stationary online contention resolution schemes (S-OCRSs)," a permutation-invariant class of OCRSs in which the distribution of the selected feasible set is independent of arrival order. We show that S-OCRSs admit an exact distributional characterization together with a universal online implementation. We then develop a general `maximum-entropy' approach to construct and analyze S-OCRSs, reducing the design of online policies to constructing suitable distributions over feasible sets. This yields a new technical framework for designing simple and possibly improved OCRSs. We demonstrate the power of this framework across several canonical feasibility environments. In particular, we obtain an improved $(3-\sqrt{5})/2$-selectable OCRS for bipartite matchings, attaining the independence benchmark conjectured to be optimal and yielding the best known prophet inequality for this setting. We also obtain a $1-\sqrt{2/(\pi k)} + O(1/k)$-selectable OCRS for $k$-uniform matroids and a simple, explicit $1/2$-selectable OCRS for weakly Rayleigh matroids (including all $\mathbb{C}$-representable matroids such as graphic and laminar). While these guarantees match the best known bounds, our framework also yields concrete and systematic constructions, providing transparent algorithms in settings where previous OCRSs were implicit or technically involved.

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BibTeXRIS

Mohammad Reza Aminian, Rad Niazadeh, Pranav Nuti. 2026-03-23. Stationary Online Contention Resolution Schemes. https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.21532

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