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Pranav Nuti

Publications and source records attributed to Pranav Nuti.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

Optimal Contention Resolution from Samples

Contention resolution schemes convert random sets which are ex-ante feasible for some constraint into sets which are feasible ex post, and their online variants have broad applications in Bayesian and stochastic optimization, including prophet inequalities and stochastic probing. In many such applications, however, full distributional knowledge is an unattainable requirement. This motivates the study of contention resolution schemes which employ a limited number of samples from the underlying distributions. We study sample-based contention resolution for $k$-uniform matroids, for both uniformly random and adversarial arrival orders, and compare their balance guarantees to the best possible with full distributional knowledge. For a single-item constraint, we show that one sample per element suffices for an optimal $(1-1/e)$-balanced ROCRS. For adversarial arrivals, however, we prove that no single-sample OCRS can be $1/2$-balanced, even for known arrival orders, separating contention resolution from prophet inequalities in the single-sample setting. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that two samples are necessary and sufficient for the optimal $1/2$ guarantee. We also present a single-sample $0.48$-balanced scheme. For general $k$, we give a simple single-sample ROCRS that achieves an optimal balance ratio of $1-e^{-k}k^k/k!$. In adversarial order, we obtain a single-sample $(1 - O(1/\sqrt{k}))$-balanced scheme, matching the optimal asymptotic dependence on $k$. Finally, we complete the picture by characterizing the minimum number of samples needed to match the optimal balance ratio achievable with full distributional knowledge. For random arrivals, one sample suffices for $k = 1,2,3,4$, and zero samples suffice for $k \geq 5$. For an adversarial arrival order, even known in advance, and any $k \geq 2$, we show that no constant number of samples suffices to achieve optimal balance.

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Prophet Inequalities with Cancellation Costs

Most of the literature on online algorithms and sequential decision-making in revenue management focuses on settings with irrevocable decisions. Motivated by modern applications such as cloud spot markets, selling banner ads, and online hotel booking, we study "prophet inequalities with cancellations" under linear cancellation costs (the buyback model). A sequence of independent random variables $X_1, X_2, \ldots$ with known distributions is revealed one by one. After accepting $X_j$, a decision-maker may later discard it and accept another variable at a cost of $f \times X_j$, where $f \ge 0$. The goal is to maximize the expected net reward: the value of the final accepted variable minus the total cancellation cost. We compare online policies with an omniscient optimal offline "prophet" benchmark. Our first main result is an optimal prophet inequality for all parameters $f \ge 0$. We fully characterize the worst-case competitive ratio of the optimal online policy against the optimal offline benchmark via a differential equation, for which we provide a constructive solution. Our second main result is a simple polynomial-time randomized adaptive policy that achieves this optimal competitive ratio. Our policy is order-agnostic (in the sense of Samuel-Cahn (1984)): it only needs to know the set of distributions and not their arrival order. These results follow from reductions to a continuous "generalized flow problem," viewed as the dual to a factor-revealing LP for the worst-case competitive ratio. Our techniques include a geometric interpretation of its solution via a differential equation and the embedding of random variables into specific Poisson point processes. We also use these building blocks to construct lower-bound instances and to design and analyze our

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Dynamic Matching with Abandonment: Optimal Guarantees via Static Priority Policies

We study stochastic dynamic matching with abandonment, a fundamental model in which agents of different types arrive over time, may abandon the market while waiting, and can be matched in pairs for rewards that depend on their types. No online policy can guarantee more than $0.5$ of the omniscient benchmark, which knows all arrival and departure times. Whether this guarantee is achievable has been a central open problem, even in special cases. We resolve this problem by showing that, on every instance, a simple static priority policy, which is computable in polynomial time, earns at least $0.5$ of the omniscient benchmark. This establishes that the optimal competitive ratio is exactly $0.5$, improving the previous best guarantee of 0.192 for the general model [Li et al. 2026; Collina et al. 2020] Our analysis rests on a key stochastic result, which is a new lower bound on the probability that some agent from a given set of types is available. Building on this bound, we develop two approaches: a primal approach that reads the priorities from an optimal solution of a novel linear program, and a dual approach that assigns a ``value'' to each type, and prioritizes matches with high ``surplus'' (reward minus value of involved agents). These values are the unique solution of a fixed-point equation derived from linear programming duality. We also show that the two approaches are closely connected.

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Stationary Online Contention Resolution Schemes: Theory and Applications to Bayesian Online Resource Allocation

Motivated by problems in Bayesian reusable resource allocation, we introduce the concept of stationary online contention resolution schemes (S-OCRSs). OCRSs are a central tool used to solve non-reusable resource allocation problems. They convert solutions to fluid approximations of problems into feasible online policies while approximately preserving allocation probabilities. S-OCRSs depart from standard OCRSs in that they ensure that the probability of allocating any given set of resources is independent of the arrival order of requests. We show how S-OCRSs can be used to solve reusable resource allocation problems, and discuss a general 'maximum-entropy' approach to construct and analyze S-OCRSs. Our approach, using a unified method for a variety of feasibility constraints, obtains results that match the state-of-the-art for OCRSs, and even improves it for a bipartite matching feasibility constraint. Our results for reusable resource allocation also extend to the assortment optimization setting, and our policies can be implemented using prices.

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Online Matching and Contention Resolution for Edge Arrivals with Vanishing Probabilities

We study the performance of sequential contention resolution and matching algorithms on random graphs with vanishing edge probabilities. When the edges of the graph are processed in an adversarially-chosen order, we derive a new OCRS that is $0.382$-selectable, attaining the "independence benchmark" from the literature under the vanishing edge probabilities assumption. Complementary to this positive result, we show that no OCRS can be more than $0.390$-selectable, significantly improving upon the upper bound of $0.428$ from the literature. We also derive negative results that are specialized to bipartite graphs or subfamilies of OCRSs. Meanwhile, when the edges of the graph are processed in a uniformly random order, we show that the simple greedy contention resolution scheme which accepts all active and feasible edges is $1/2$-selectable. This result is tight due to a known upper bound. We then show that when the algorithm can choose the processing order, a slight tweak to the random order---give each vertex a random priority and process edges in lexicographic order---results in a strictly better contention resolution scheme that is $1-\ln(2-1/e)\approx0.510$-selectable. Moreover, we show that this bound is tight over any sequential contention resolution scheme, even one which may adaptively choose the order in which it processes edges. This provides a separation from the $0.544$ upper bound for offline contention resolution implied by the classic result of Karp and Sipser. Our positive results also apply to online matching on $1$-uniform random graphs with vanishing (non-identical) edge probabilities, extending and unifying some results from the random graphs literature.

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Prophet Inequalities and Online Contention Resolution for Matchoids

In the classical prophet inequality, an algorithm observes a sequence of random variables with known distributions in an online fashion, and it must select one of the random variables with the goal of maximizing the expected value of its selection. The performance of the algorithm is compared to an \textit{omniscient prophet} who observes all of the random variables before having to make its selection. Combinatorial extensions of the classical prophet inequality in which the algorithm gets to pick a subset of the random variables (constrained to belong to some family of feasible sets) have been studied extensively. We study prophet inequalities with a $k$-matchoid constraint (a common generalization of a $k$-matroid intersection constraint and a $k$-bounded hypergraph matching constraint) in two common online arrival models. We give guarantees with respect to the \textit{ex-ante} fractional relaxation of the omniscient prophet, obtaining an ex-ante competitive ratio of $\frac{1}{k+1}$ in the adversarial order case, and $\frac{1-e^{-k}}{k}$ in the random order case. Using the duality framework of Lee and Singla \cite{Lee2018}, this also yields online contention resolution schemes in these settings. Our adversarial-order prophet inequality can be viewed as a generalization of a recent $\frac12$-competitive matroid prophet inequality by Kalantarzadeh and Pashkovich, 2026. This generalization introduces a new framework: coordinated weighted principal partitions across multiple matroids. Our random-order prophet inequality is a generalization of the $k=1$ matroid case of Lee and Singla, 2018. The two results improve previously known competitive ratios for $k$-matroid intersection, which were $\frac{1}{(e+o(1))k}$ and $\frac{1}{k+1}$, respectively.

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Static Pricing for Single Sample Multi-unit Prophet Inequalities

In this paper, we study $k$-unit single sample prophet inequalities. A seller has $k$ identical, indivisible items to sell. A sequence of buyers arrive one-by-one, with each buyer's private value for the item, $X_i$, revealed to the seller when they arrive. While the seller is unaware of the distribution from which $X_i$ is drawn, they have access to a single sample, $Y_i$ drawn from the same distribution as $X_i$. What strategies can the seller adopt for selling items so as to maximize social welfare? Previous work has demonstrated that when $k = 1$, if the seller sets a price equal to the maximum of the samples, they can achieve a competitive ratio of $\frac{1}{2}$ of the social welfare, and recently Pashkovich and Sayutina established an analogous result for $k = 2$. In this paper, we prove that for $k \geq 3$, setting a (static) price equal to the $k^{\text{th}}$ largest sample also obtains a competitive ratio of $\frac{1}{2}$, resolving a conjecture Pashkovich and Sayutina pose. We also consider the situation where $k$ is large. We demonstrate that setting a price equal to the $(k-\sqrt{2k\log k})^{\text{th}}$ largest sample obtains a competitive ratio of $1 - \sqrt{\frac{2\log k}{k}} - o\left(\sqrt{\frac{\log k}{k}}\right)$, and that this is the optimal possible ratio achievable with a static pricing scheme with access to a single sample. This should be compared against a competitive ratio $1 - \sqrt{\frac{\log k}{k}} - o\left(\sqrt{\frac{\log k}{k}}\right)$, which is the optimal possible ratio achievable with a static pricing scheme with knowledge of the distributions of the values.

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Towards an Optimal Contention Resolution Scheme for Matchings

In this paper, we study contention resolution schemes for matchings. Given a fractional matching $x$ and a random set $R(x)$ where each edge $e$ appears independently with probability $x_e$, we want to select a matching $M \subseteq R(x)$ such that $\Pr[e \in M \mid e \in R(x)] \geq c$, for $c$ as large as possible. We call such a selection method a $c$-balanced contention resolution scheme. Our main results are (i) an asymptotically (in the limit as $\|x\|_\infty$ goes to 0) optimal $\simeq 0.544$-balanced contention resolution scheme for general matchings, and (ii) a $0.509$-balanced contention resolution scheme for bipartite matchings. To the best of our knowledge, this result establishes for the first time, in any natural relaxation of a combinatorial optimization problem, a separation between (i) offline and random order online contention resolution schemes, and (ii) monotone and non-monotone contention resolution schemes. We also present an application of our scheme to a combinatorial allocation problem, and discuss some open questions related to van der Waerden's conjecture for the permanent of doubly stochastic matrices.

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Engaging activities for teaching linear algebra

This paper discusses several linear algebra activities designed to help enhance students' skills in collaborating, exploring mathematics, and linking together abstract and visual ways of approaching mathematics. Most of these activities are short, accessible, engaging, and easy to incorporate into any classroom. In addition, we discuss some questions instructors can ask themselves to design novel and engaging activities when constrained to teaching from a particular curriculum.

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A Tight Competitive Ratio for Online Submodular Welfare Maximization

In this paper we consider the online Submodular Welfare (SW) problem. In this problem we are given $n$ bidders each equipped with a general (not necessarily monotone) submodular utility and $m$ items that arrive online. The goal is to assign each item, once it arrives, to a bidder or discard it, while maximizing the sum of utilities. When an adversary determines the items' arrival order we present a simple randomized algorithm that achieves a tight competitive ratio of $\nicefrac{1}{4}$. The algorithm is a specialization of an algorithm due to [Harshaw-Kazemi-Feldman-Karbasi MOR`22], who presented the previously best known competitive ratio of $3-2\sqrt{2}\approx 0.171573 $ to the problem. When the items' arrival order is uniformly random, we present a competitive ratio of $\approx 0.27493$, improving the previously known $\nicefrac{1}{4}$ guarantee. Our approach for the latter result is based on a better analysis of the (offline) Residual Random Greedy (RRG) algorithm of [Buchbinder-Feldman-Naor-Schwartz SODA`14], which we believe might be of independent interest.

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Secretary Problems: The Power of a Single Sample

In this paper, we investigate two variants of the secretary problem. In these variants, we are presented with a sequence of numbers $X_i$ that come from distributions $\mathcal{D}_i$, and that arrive in either random or adversarial order. We do not know what the distributions are, but we have access to a single sample $Y_i$ from each distribution $\mathcal{D}_i$. After observing each number, we have to make an irrevocable decision about whether we would like to accept it or not with the goal of maximizing the probability of selecting the largest number. The random order version of this problem was first studied by Correa et al. [SODA 2020] who managed to construct an algorithm that achieves a probability of $0.4529$. In this paper, we improve this probability to $0.5009$, almost matching an upper bound of $\simeq 0.5024$ which we show follows from earlier work. We also show that there is an algorithm which achieves the probability of $\simeq 0.5024$ asymptotically if no particular distribution is especially likely to yield the largest number. For the adversarial order version of the problem, we show that we can select the maximum number with a probability of $1/4$, and that this is best possible. Our work demonstrates that unlike in the case of the expected value objective studied by Rubinstein et al. [ITCS 2020], knowledge of a single sample is not enough to recover the factor of success guaranteed by full knowledge of the distribution.

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The Secretary Problem with Distributions

We study a variant of the secretary problem where candidates come from independent, not necessarily identical distributions known to us, and show that we can do at least as well as in the IID setting. This resolves a conjecture of Esfandiari et al.

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