SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2603.27762

When "Normalization Without Loss of Generality" Loses Generality

Abstract

Normalization is ubiquitous in economics, and a growing literature shows that ``normalizations'' can matter for interpretation, counterfactual analysis, misspecification, and inference. This paper provides a general framework for these issues, based on the formalized notion of modeling equivalence that partitions the space of unknowns into equivalence classes, and defines normalization as a WLOG selection of one representative from each class. A counterfactual parameter is normalization-free if and only if it is constant on equivalence classes; otherwise any point identification is created by the normalization rather than by the model. Applications to discrete choice, demand estimation, and network formation illustrate the insights made explicit through this criterion. We then study two further sources of fragility: an extension trilemma establishes that fidelity, invariance, and regularity cannot simultaneously hold at a boundary singularity, while a normalization can itself introduce a coordinate singularity that distorts the topological and metric structures of the parameter space, with consequences for estimation and inference.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Wayne Gao. 2026-03-29. When "Normalization Without Loss of Generality" Loses Generality. https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.27762

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Identification in Linear Quantile Panel Models

This paper studies identification in linear quantile panel models with unrestricted individual heterogeneity when the number of time periods is fixed and small. We impose strict exogeneity, whereby the conditional quantile restriction holds given the individual's complete regressor history and latent individual effect, but otherwise allow the disturbances to be arbitrarily dependent over time.

econ.EM

Experimental Design for Policy Choice

We show how to optimally design experiments when the resulting data will be used to choose a welfare-maximizing policy subject to constraints. A decision maker seeks to maximize Bayes expected welfare by choosing a policy whose effects depend on an unknown finite-dimensional parameter. The decision maker has access to a first wave of experimental data with a fixed design but may choose the design of a second wave that will be collected before choosing the policy. The resulting experimental design--policy choice problem is a very high-dimensional dynamic program that is generally intractable in finite samples. We propose a tractable approximation based on the limit experiment and show it is asymptotically optimal using a new asymptotic representation theorem for adaptive experiments with continuous treatments. We apply the method to a conditional cash transfer experiment and demonstrate the potential for large gains from tailoring the experiment to the policy choice.

econ.EM

Designing Spatial Treatments

Spatial treatments are interventions assigned to locations potentially distinct from those of the responding units. We study their optimal design under a general model in which a unit's response diminishes with distance to a treated site. Our estimand of interest is an ``uncontaminated'' effect equal to the average impact of a single intervention site over all hypothetical sites. We propose a novel design based on a Mat\'{e}rn point process which separates treatments by a distance of at least $r$. A larger choice of $r$ reduces bias by separating interventions but increases variance by reducing their numerosity. We choose $r$ to maximize the rate of convergence of a Horvitz-Thompson estimator and prove that this is minimax rate-optimal. We provide weak conditions under which the estimator is asymptotically normal and propose a variance estimator.

econ.EM