arXiv · 2605.23316
Formal Verification of Probing Security via Conditional Independence
Abstract
Side-channel attacks are a major threat to the security of cryptosystems. Masking is a widely used countermeasure against such attacks, but proving the security of masked algorithms is error-prone without formal verification. In this work, we propose a novel approach to formal verification of noninterference properties of masked algorithms based on probabilistic separation logic. By establishing a connection between noninterference and conditional independence, we show how noninterference can be verified using Lilac, a separation logic for conditional independence. We also provide several proof rules that facilitate the verification of probing security and demonstrate their application to example algorithms.
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Satoshi Kura, Katsuyuki Takashima. 2026-05-22. Formal Verification of Probing Security via Conditional Independence. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.23316
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