Bounded Morality: Defining the Space of Moral Computation

Abstract

Moral cognition has traditionally been modeled as adherence to fixed ethical theories--deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics--implemented as static rules or value functions. We propose Bounded Morality, a formal framework for analyzing the computational demands of moral problems faced by finite agents. Extending Herbert Simon's notion of bounded rationality, we formalize moral situations along two orthogonal dimensions: moral breadth, the scope of entities treated as morally relevant, and moral depth, the inferential integration required to evaluate their interactions. Limited resources impose an unavoidable tradeoff between these dimensions, defining a feasible space of moral computation. Within this space, ethical theories correspond to locally efficient strategies adapted to different demand regimes rather than competing accounts of moral truth. The framework yields a formal notion of moral regret and moral progress under constraint, and implies that moral alignment in artificial systems depends on the scaling and allocation of moral reasoning capacity rather than on direct imitation of human judgments.