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Max Kanwal

Publications and source records attributed to Max Kanwal.

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Constructive Alignment: Governing Preference Dynamics in Human-AI Interaction

Most approaches to AI alignment treat human preferences as fixed targets to be inferred and optimized. This assumption conflicts with extensive empirical evidence showing that preferences are layered, dynamic, and constructed through interaction--particularly with adaptive technologies. As AI systems become more persistent, personalized, and socially embedded, they increasingly participate in shaping what people attend to, value, and endorse over time. We introduce Constructive Alignment, a paradigm that reframes alignment as a control problem over evolving human preference trajectories rather than static preference satisfaction. Drawing on behavioral economics, psychology, and constructivist social theory, we model preferences as layered state variables that evolve under interaction with AI systems. We formalize this view using a control-theoretic framework in which system actions and interaction design jointly influence both world states and human evaluative states. We argue that alignment is not primarily about controlling AI behavior, but about regulating how AI systems influence the evolution of human preferences--ensuring that value trajectories remain coherent, reflectively endorsed, epistemically grounded, bounded against manipulation, and empowering under uncertainty. Alignment thus becomes a problem of governing long-term value formation rather than simply satisfying static preferences.

cs.AI

Bounded Morality: Defining the Space of Moral Computation

Moral cognition has traditionally been modeled as adherence to fixed ethical theories--deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics--implemented as static rules or value functions. We propose Bounded Morality, a formal framework for analyzing the computational demands of moral problems faced by finite agents. Extending Herbert Simon's notion of bounded rationality, we formalize moral situations along two orthogonal dimensions: moral breadth, the scope of entities treated as morally relevant, and moral depth, the inferential integration required to evaluate their interactions. Limited resources impose an unavoidable tradeoff between these dimensions, defining a feasible space of moral computation. Within this space, ethical theories correspond to locally efficient strategies adapted to different demand regimes rather than competing accounts of moral truth. The framework yields a formal notion of moral regret and moral progress under constraint, and implies that moral alignment in artificial systems depends on the scaling and allocation of moral reasoning capacity rather than on direct imitation of human judgments.

cs.AI