Approval-Based Apportionment: Like Portioning, Approximately like Committee Voting

Paul Gölz; Hannane Yaghoubizade

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arXiv · 2608.27605

Approval-Based Apportionment: Like Portioning, Approximately like Committee Voting

Paul Gölz·Hannane Yaghoubizade

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Abstract

We study approval-based apportionment, a variant of committee elections in which candidates ("parties") can be selected several times. We show that the proportionality axioms EJR, EJR+, and FJR coincide, and so do PJR, PJR+, and FPJR; that Lindahl priceability, an axiom implying core stability, is equivalent to a notion of approximate optimality with respect to the proportional approval voting (PAV) score; and that locally PAV-optimal committees are priceable. Approval-based apportionment (where a candidate receives an integer number of seats) lies between committee elections (zero or one seat) and portioning (a fractional number of seats). We formally connect portioning and apportionment by giving a construction that lifts axioms from apportionment to portioning and preserves implications between them. Several of our new implications between apportionment axioms are natural from a portioning perspective, leading us to believe that apportionment sits closer to portioning than to committee elections. None of them holds in committee elections, but several extend approximately, which makes apportionment a fruitful setting for conjecturing approximate relationships in approval-based committee elections.

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Paul Gölz, Hannane Yaghoubizade. 2026-08-27. Approval-Based Apportionment: Like Portioning, Approximately like Committee Voting. https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27605

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