SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2609.02900

DisclosureBeta: A Measurement-Channel Theory for Regime-Conditioned Betas from LLM-Read Risk Disclosures

Abstract

The problem is the beta a desk needs when a firm's price history is too short to trust: an S-1 filer, a recent listing, or a name just past a regime break. The state of the art collapses to a comparable-firm peer beta with no error budget, and the recent text-based competitor Breitung (2025) reports strong empirical IPO accuracy but no identification theory, no error budget, and no lower bound. We fill that gap. We model a large language model as a noisy measurement channel on a firm's latent risk characteristics and write its channel noise into the asset-pricing error budget. In a piecewise-stationary Fama-French five-factor model the loadings are a function of latent risk characteristics and an inferred regime. We prove identification and consistency of the regime-conditional loading function under explicit assumptions on the channel, the detector, and within-regime sampling, and give a matching lower bound showing that the disclosure-noise and detector-misclassification terms are unavoidable for any estimator that observes only returns, factors, LLM features, and a regime estimate. A disclosure-incentive corollary makes estimation precision monotone in a firm-level disclosure-incentive measure (DIM). An adaptive convex combination of the text-based and rolling-window estimators is never worse than either component and shifts its weight toward text exactly when price history is short, stale, or straddles a detected regime break. The empirical evaluation on a frozen, pre-registered panel of price-history-thin firms is forthcoming; this preprint records the theory and the pre-registered design so priority is established independently of the empirical outcome.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Ping Kuen Wong. 2026-07-05. DisclosureBeta: A Measurement-Channel Theory for Regime-Conditioned Betas from LLM-Read Risk Disclosures. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02900

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

Discover connections

Connections use source metadata and explicit phrase matches, not verified experimental comparisons.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Machine Learning Classification and Portfolio Construction: Does the Loss Function Matter?

Classification outperforms regression across matched machine learning models in portfolio construction. A stacking ensemble of gradient boosted tree, random forest, and neural network yields a value-weighted annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.08 for classification and 1.39 for regression. This outperformance strengthens with class granularity and persists across subsamples and after transaction costs. Spanning tests show that classification retains economically large alphas after we control for regression, whereas regression alphas shrink substantially once we control for classification. These results indicate that classification extracts more return information than matched regression. Our diagnostics trace classification's advantage to more precise separation of return deciles.

q-fin.GN

Algorithmic Collusion by Large Language Models

We conduct experiments with algorithmic pricing agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs). In oligopoly settings, LLM-based pricing agents quickly and autonomously reach supracompetitive prices and profits. Variation in seemingly innocuous phrases in LLM instructions ("prompts") substantially influence the degree of supracompetitive pricing. We develop novel techniques for behavioral analysis of LLMs and use them to uncover price-war concerns as a contributing factor. Our results extend to auction settings. Our findings uncover unique challenges to any future regulation of LLM-based pricing agents, and AI-based pricing agents more broadly.

econ.GN

How Wasteful is Signaling?

Signaling is wasteful. But how wasteful? We study the fraction of surplus dissipated in a separating equilibrium. For isoelastic environments, this waste ratio has a simple formula: $β/(β+σ)$, where $β$ is the benefit elasticity (reward to higher perception) and $σ$ is the elasticity of higher types' relative cost advantage. The ratio is constant across types and is independent of other parameters, including convexity of cost in the signal. We show that the directional effects of $β$ and $σ$ on waste extend to non-isoelastic environments. In an application to signaling tournaments, more competitors or fewer prizes increase waste, with full dissipation in large tournaments.

econ.GN