arXiv · 2609.03883
Inferring Affective Consciousness in an Artificial Agent: A Case Study
Abstract
Creatures that display 'hedonic place preference behaviour' are thought by many scientists to experience feelings, on the assumption that their attraction to pleasure-producing substances which lack nutritional value (e.g. cocaine, morphine) cannot easily be attributed to unconscious instinctual behaviour. In this paper, we discuss how a simple artificial agent that instantiates attributes of an affective system engaging in felt uncertainty about its intrinsic needs in relation to environmental resources can similarly display hedonic place preference behaviour -- through an apparently subjective form of information processing -- while simultaneously being entirely deter-ministic. We outline some implications of this artificially engineered behaviour for our understanding of the physical basis of consciousness and the experience of free will.
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Mark Solms, St John Grimbly, Bruce Bassett, Evert Boonstra, Rowan Hodson, Nicolas Kuske, Kival Mahadew, Benjamin Rosman, Charel van Hoof, Jonathan Shock. 2026-09-03. Inferring Affective Consciousness in an Artificial Agent: A Case Study. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.33.7.014
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