The Fine-Grained Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibrium and Free Games

Abstract

We study the fine-grained complexity of computing approximate Nash equilibria and approximating the value of free games in the regime where the approximation error vanishes. Under the PCP for PPAD and ETH for PPAD conjectures, we show that computing $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria in 2-player $N$-action normal-form games requires time $N^{(\log(N)/\varepsilon^2)^{1-o(1)}}$, thus showing that the classical Lipton-Markakis-Mehta algorithm (2003) is optimal through all regimes of $\varepsilon = \omega(1/\sqrt{N})$. While such optimality was known in the constant-$\varepsilon$ regime (Rubinstein, 2016), previous work could only rule out significantly smaller running times of $N^{O(\log(N)/\varepsilon)}$ in the regime $\varepsilon = o(1)$. Using similar techniques, we then establish an analogous tight lower bound of $N^{(\log(N)/\varepsilon^2)^{1-o(1)}}$ under ETH for $\varepsilon$-additive value estimation in free games, when $\varepsilon \geq 2^{-o(\sqrt{\log N})}$, answering a question of Aaronson, Impagliazzo, and Moshkovitz (2014).