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arXiv · 2609.10556

MLN-EIGS: A multilayer network framework for solving Stackelberg escape interdiction games on dynamic transportation networks

Abstract

Interdicting an escaping criminal with limited police resources on large-scale transportation networks is a challenging problem due to the dynamic nature of both attacker movement and defender deployment. This paper proposes \emph{MLN-EIGS}, a multilayer network-based framework for solving dynamic escape interdiction problems formulated as a Stackelberg security game. A time-expanded multilayer network is constructed to explicitly model the temporal evolution of the transportation network and the feasible movements of both the attacker and the defenders. The attacker seeks to maximize the probability of successful escape, while the defenders aim to maximize the probability of interdiction. To efficiently compute the attacker's best response, the probabilistic escape formulation is transformed into an equivalent shortest-path problem through a logarithmic transformation, enabling the use of Dijkstra's algorithm. Since the defender best-response problem is computationally intractable, an approximation defender oracle is developed to generate high-quality defender strategies on the multilayer network. The proposed MLN-EIGS framework is benchmarked against an exact mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)-based Stackelberg formulation on a large real-world transportation network. Computational experiments demonstrate that MLN-EIGS consistently achieves defender utilities that closely match those of the exact MILP approach while substantially reducing computational time. These results demonstrate that the proposed MLN-EIGS framework provides an effective, computationally efficient, and scalable alternative to exact MILP-based Stackelberg optimization for large-scale dynamic escape interdiction problems.

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BibTeXRIS

Sukanya Samanta, Kei Kimura, Makoto Yokoo, Palash Dey. 2026-07-11. MLN-EIGS: A multilayer network framework for solving Stackelberg escape interdiction games on dynamic transportation networks. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10556

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