arXiv subjects

Makoto Yokoo

Publications and source records attributed to Makoto Yokoo.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Keep Everyone Happy: Online Fair Division of Numerous Items with Few Copies

This paper considers a novel variant of the online fair division problem involving multiple agents in which a learner sequentially observes an indivisible item that must be irrevocably allocated to one of the agents to achieve a desired balance between fairness and efficiency. Existing algorithms assume a small number of items with a sufficiently large number of copies, which ensures a good utility estimation for all item-agent pairs from noisy observed utilities. However, this assumption may not hold in many real-life applications, e.g., an online platform with a large number of users (items) who use the platform's service providers (agents) only a few times (a few copies of items), making it difficult to accurately estimate utilities for all item-agent pairs. To address this limitation, we assume utility is an unknown function of item-agent features. We propose algorithms that model online fair division as a contextual bandit problem and achieve provable sublinear regret. Our experimental results further validate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Non-obvious Manipulability with Groups in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets

In Shapley-Scarf housing markets, Ma (1994) shows that top trading cycles (TTC) is the unique mechanism satisfying individual rationality (IR), Pareto efficiency (PE), and strategy-proofness. We ask what other mechanisms become possible when strategy-proofness is replaced by a weaker condition called non-obvious manipulability (NOM), introduced by Troyan and Morrill (2020). We first show that this weaker condition does not help on its own: every IR and PE mechanism is already NOM. We therefore introduce a new condition: NOM with groups, under which each agent knows the preferences of the other members of her group, but not those of agents outside the group. This condition reduces to strategy-proofness when all agents belong to one group, and to standard NOM when every group is a singleton. Also, we introduce a participation condition called group rationality (GR), which requires that no group do worse than it would by trading only among its own members. We then define a class of mechanisms called TTC with super-groups, whose members satisfy GR, PE, and NOM with groups. The class includes mechanisms that differ from standard TTC, including mechanisms that are not strategy-proof. Furthermore, we show that every mechanism that satisfies GR, PE, and NOM with groups has the same best- and worst-case outcomes as every TTC with super-groups mechanism.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Stress-Relief Annealing: Polynomial-Time Simulation-Free Layout Optimization for Automated Warehouses

We study the problem of optimizing physical layouts for automated warehouses, where hundreds to thousands of robots are coordinated to transport packages. Previous works have shown that optimizing the warehouse layout (e.g., the physical location of the storage shelves) significantly improves throughput. However, state-of-the-art layout optimization approaches are based on evolutionary optimization methods, which treat the entire warehouse as a black box and rely on random mutation to search for high-quality layouts. While the optimization outcomes are promising, these methods require a massive number of simulations to evaluate candidate solutions, making them sample-inefficient. In this paper, we present Stress-Relief Annealing (SRA), a polynomial-time simulation-free layout optimization algorithm. SRA turns the task demand into a per-vertex \emph{stress field} that predicts where traffic will concentrate in the warehouse; the field's peak provably caps the throughput. Our experimental results show that (1) SRA improves both the throughput and the scalability of a human-designed warehouse, roughly doubling the number of robots it can sustain, (2) it matches or exceeds the throughput of the evolutionary baselines while taking only $19$ minutes on one CPU core, against their $25{,}000$ simulations and $25$ hours on a $64$-core machine, and (3) the gain generalizes across different Multi-Agent Path Finding algorithms, non-uniform task demands, and a warehouse with doubled dimensions.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

MLN-EIGS: A multilayer network framework for solving Stackelberg escape interdiction games on dynamic transportation networks

Interdicting an escaping criminal with limited police resources on large-scale transportation networks is a challenging problem due to the dynamic nature of both attacker movement and defender deployment. This paper proposes \emph{MLN-EIGS}, a multilayer network-based framework for solving dynamic escape interdiction problems formulated as a Stackelberg security game. A time-expanded multilayer network is constructed to explicitly model the temporal evolution of the transportation network and the feasible movements of both the attacker and the defenders. The attacker seeks to maximize the probability of successful escape, while the defenders aim to maximize the probability of interdiction. To efficiently compute the attacker's best response, the probabilistic escape formulation is transformed into an equivalent shortest-path problem through a logarithmic transformation, enabling the use of Dijkstra's algorithm. Since the defender best-response problem is computationally intractable, an approximation defender oracle is developed to generate high-quality defender strategies on the multilayer network. The proposed MLN-EIGS framework is benchmarked against an exact mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)-based Stackelberg formulation on a large real-world transportation network. Computational experiments demonstrate that MLN-EIGS consistently achieves defender utilities that closely match those of the exact MILP approach while substantially reducing computational time. These results demonstrate that the proposed MLN-EIGS framework provides an effective, computationally efficient, and scalable alternative to exact MILP-based Stackelberg optimization for large-scale dynamic escape interdiction problems.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

MenuNet: A Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Matching Markets

Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice and labor market clearing. In practice, however, these markets are invariably governed by complex distributional constraints, ranging from diversity quotas and regional balance to global capacity slacks, under which stable matchings often fail to exist. This raises a fundamental question: how to distribute unavoidable instability across agents while preserving strategy-proofness? To address this, we propose \texttt{MenuNet}, a strategy-proof mechanism design framework based on a neural representation of menus. Rather than directly constructing assignments, \texttt{MenuNet} learns to generate personalized probabilistic menus, from which assignments are realized via a structured sequential choice rule that guarantees strategy-proofness by construction. By decomposing stability into fairness (no envy) and non-wastefulness, our approach models these properties as vector-valued quantities and optimizes their distribution through differentiable objectives, providing a principled trade-off between competing axioms. Empirically, \texttt{MenuNet} navigates this trade-off effectively: it consistently outperforms Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) in terms of envy and Deferred Acceptance (DA) in terms of waste, while maintaining scalability and computational efficiency. These results suggest that learning-based menu mechanisms provide a flexible and scalable paradigm for mechanism design in highly constrained, real-world environments.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Compatible $k$-Relaxations of Fairness and Non-Wastefulness Under Hereditary Constraints

We study two-sided matching markets under hereditary constraints, which extend beyond simple capacity limits and arise in applications such as diversity requirements and refugee resettlement. In these settings, fairness and non-wastefulness are often incompatible, and existing approaches typically address this tension by prioritizing one property at the expense of the other. We take a different approach by relaxing both properties simultaneously in a controlled and symmetric manner. We introduce two notions indexed by an integer $k$: envy-received up to $k$ peers (ER-$k$) and non-wastefulness up to $k$ objections (NW-$k$). Our main theoretical result shows that ER-$k$ and NW-$k$ are always compatible under hereditary constraints for any fixed $k$. We provide two equivalent polynomial-time algorithms to compute such matchings: a $k$-admissible cutoff algorithm and a $k$-admissible college-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Finally, experimental results demonstrate that even small relaxations achieve a favorable balance between fairness and non-wastefulness.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Solving a Stackelberg Game on Transportation Networks in a Dynamic Crime Scenario: A Mixed Approach on Multi-Layer Networks

Interdicting a criminal with limited police resources is a challenging task as the criminal changes location over time. The size of the large transportation network further adds to the difficulty of this scenario. To tackle this issue, we consider the concept of a layered graph. At each time stamp, we create a copy of the entire transportation network to track the possible movements of both players, the attacker and the defenders. We consider a Stackelberg game in a dynamic crime scenario where the attacker changes location over time while the defenders attempt to interdict the attacker on his escape route. Given a set of defender strategies, the optimal attacker strategy is determined by applying Dijkstra's algorithm on the layered networks. Here, the attacker aims to minimize while the defenders aim to maximize the probability of interdiction. We develop an approximation algorithm on the layered networks to find near-optimal strategy for defenders. The efficacy of the developed approach is compared with the adopted MILP approach. We compare the results in terms of computational time and solution quality. The quality of the results demonstrates the need for the developed approach, as it effectively solves the complex problem within a short amount of time.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Feature-based Uncertainty Model for School Choice

In this work, we consider a school choice scenario where a student does not exactly know which college is better for her. Although it is hard for a student to obtain an exact preference, she can usually compare specific features of colleges, such as reputation, location, and campus facilities. Motivated by this, we propose a feature-based uncertainty model for school choice where a student's preference is based on a linear combination of her utilities over different features, and the coefficients of the combination are treated as random variables. Our main goal is to achieve a higher probability of stability (ProS) and incentive compatibility (IC) for students. Unfortunately, these two goals are incompatible in general. We show that a student-proposing deferred acceptance (DA) that prioritizes colleges with higher expected ranking can achieve a worst-case approximation ratio of $(1/n)^n$ on ProS, while a DA with a carefully defined iterated comparison vector can guarantee the strongest achievable form of IC. Finally, we provide additional results for some specific restrictions on the model.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

A New Relaxation of Fairness in Two-Sided Matching Respecting Acquaintance Relationships

Two-sided matching, such as matching between students and schools, has been applied to various aspects of real life and has been the subject of much research, however, it has been plagued by the fact that efficiency and fairness are incompatible. In particular, Pareto efficiency and justified-envy-freeness are known to be incompatible even in the simplest one-to-one matching, i.e., the stable marriage problem. In previous research, the primary approach to improving efficiency in matchings has been to tolerate students' envy, thereby relaxing fairness constraints. In this study, we take a different approach to relaxing fairness. Specifically, it focuses on addressing only the envy that students may experience or prioritize more highly and seeks matchings without such envy. More specifically, this study assumes that envy towards students who are not acquaintances has less impact compared to envy towards students who are acquaintances. Accordingly, we assume that the students know each other or not, represented by an undirected graph, and define a local envy as a justified envy toward an acquaintance or a neighbor in the graph. We then propose the property that there is no local envy as a new relaxed concept of fairness, called local envy-freeness. We analyze whether Pareto-efficient matching can be achieved while maintaining local envy-freeness by meaningfully restricting the graph structure and the school's preferences. To analyze in detail the fairness that can achieve Pareto-efficient matching, we introduce a local version of the relaxed fairness recently proposed by Cho et al. (AAMAS 2024), which parameterizes the level of local envy-freeness by nonnegative integers. We then clarify the level of local envy-freeness that can be achieved by Pareto-efficient mechanisms for graphs that are ``close'' to trees and single-peaked preferences on the graphs.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Coalitions on the Fly in Cooperative Games

In this work, we examine a sequential setting of a cooperative game in which players arrive dynamically to form coalitions and complete tasks either together or individually, depending on the value created. Upon arrival, a new player as a decision maker faces two options: forming a new coalition or joining an existing one. We assume that players are greedy, i.e., they aim to maximize their rewards based on the information available at their arrival. The objective is to design an online value distribution policy that incentivizes players to form a coalition structure that maximizes social welfare. We focus on monotone and bounded cooperative games. Our main result establishes an upper bound of $\frac{3\mathsf{min}}{\mathsf{max}}$ on the competitive ratio for any irrevocable policy (i.e., one without redistribution), and proposes a policy that achieves a near-optimal competitive ratio of $\min\left\{\frac{1}{2}, \frac{3\mathsf{min}}{\mathsf{max}}\right\}$, where $\mathsf{min}$ and $\mathsf{max}$ denote the smallest and largest marginal contribution of any sub-coalition of players respectively. Finally, we also consider non-irrevocable policies, with alternative bounds only when the number of players is limited.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

COBRA: Contextual Bandit Algorithm for Ensuring Truthful Strategic Agents

This paper considers a contextual bandit problem involving multiple agents, where a learner sequentially observes the contexts and the agent's reported arms, and then selects the arm that maximizes the system's overall reward. Existing work in contextual bandits assumes that agents truthfully report their arms, which is unrealistic in many real-life applications. For instance, consider an online platform with multiple sellers; some sellers may misrepresent product quality to gain an advantage, such as having the platform preferentially recommend their products to online users. To address this challenge, we propose an algorithm, COBRA, for contextual bandit problems involving strategic agents that disincentivize their strategic behavior without using any monetary incentives, while having incentive compatibility and a sub-linear regret guarantee. Our experimental results also validate the different performance aspects of our proposed algorithm.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Whoever Said Money Won't Solve All Your Problems? Weighted Envy-free Allocation with Subsidy

We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where each agent deems their allocated portion relative to their entitlement at least as favorable as any others relative to their own. Often, achieving WEF necessitates monetary transfers, which can be modeled as third-party subsidies. The goal is to attain WEF with bounded subsidies. Previous work relied on characterizations of unweighted envy-freeness (EF), that fail in the weighted setting. This makes our new setting challenging. We present polynomial-time algorithms that compute WEF allocations with a guaranteed upper bound on total subsidy for monotone valuations and various subclasses thereof. We also present an efficient algorithm to compute a fair allocation of items and money, when the budget is not enough to make the allocation WEF. This algorithm is new even for the unweighted setting.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Probabilistic Analysis of Stable Matching in Large Markets with Siblings

We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as observed in the hospital-doctor matching problems involving couples. Intriguingly, stable matchings are consistently observed in real-world daycare markets, despite the prevalence of sibling applicants. We conduct a probabilistic analysis of large random markets to examine the existence of stable matchings in such markets. Specifically, we examine scenarios where daycare centers have similar priorities over children, a common characteristic in real-world markets. Our analysis reveals that as the market size approaches infinity, the likelihood of stable matchings existing converges to 1. To facilitate our exploration, we refine an existing heuristic algorithm to address a more rigorous stability concept, as the original one may fail to meet this criterion. Through extensive experiments on both real-world and synthetic datasets, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our revised algorithm in identifying stable matchings, particularly when daycare priorities exhibit high similarity.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Achieving Balanced Representation in School Choice with Diversity Goals

Student placements under diversity constraints are a common practice globally. This paper addresses the selection of students by a single school under a \emph{one-to-one convention}, where students can belong to multiple types but are counted only once based on one type. While existing algorithms in economics and computer science aim to help schools meet diversity goals and priorities, we demonstrate that these methods can result in significant imbalances among students with different type combinations. To address this issue, we introduce a new property called \emph{balanced representation}, which ensures fair representation across all types and type combinations. We propose a straightforward choice function that uniquely satisfies four fundamental properties: maximal diversity, non-wastefulness, justified envy-freeness, and balanced representation. While previous research has primarily focused on algorithms based on bipartite graphs, we take a different approach by utilizing flow networks. This method provides a more compact formalization of the problem and significantly improves computational efficiency. Additionally, we present efficient algorithms for implementing our choice function within both the bipartite graph and flow network frameworks.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Neural Double Auction Mechanism

Mechanism design, a branch of economics, aims to design rules that can autonomously achieve desired outcomes in resource allocation and public decision making. The research on mechanism design using machine learning is called automated mechanism design or mechanism learning. In our research, we constructed a new network based on the existing method for single auctions and aimed to automatically design a mechanism by applying it to double auctions. In particular, we focused on the following four desirable properties for the mechanism: individual rationality, balanced budget, Pareto efficiency, and incentive compatibility. We conducted experiments assuming a small-scale double auction and clarified how deterministic the trade matching of the obtained mechanism is. We also confirmed how much the learnt mechanism satisfies the four properties compared to two representative protocols. As a result, we verified that the mechanism is more budget-balanced than the VCG protocol and more economically efficient than the MD protocol, with the incentive compatibility mostly guaranteed.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Parameterized Voter Relevance in Facility Location Games with Tree-Shaped Invitation Graphs

Diffusion mechanism design, which investigate how to incentivise agents to invite as many colleagues to a multi-agent decision making as possible, is a new research paradigm at the intersection between microeconomics and computer science. In this paper we extend traditional facility location games into the model of diffusion mechanism design. Our objective is to completely understand to what extent of anonymity/voter-relevance we can achieve, along with strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency when voters strategically invite collegues. We define a series of anonymity properties applicable to the diffusion mechanism design model, as well as parameterized voter-relevance properties for guaranteeing reasonably-fair decision making. We obtained two impossibility theorems and two existence theorems, which partially answer the question we have raised in the beginning of the paper

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Weighted Envy-free Allocation with Subsidy

We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items with subsidies when agents have weighted entitlements. After highlighting several important differences from the unweighted case, we present several results concerning weighted envy-freeability including general characterizations, algorithms for achieving and testing weighted envy-freeability, lower and upper bounds of the amount of subsidies for envy-freeable allocations, and algorithms for achieving weighted envy-freeability along with other properties.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Analyzing Incentives and Fairness in Ordered Weighted Average for Facility Location Games

Facility location games provide an abstract model of mechanism design. In such games, a mechanism takes a profile of $n$ single-peaked preferences over an interval as an input and determines the location of a facility on the interval. In this paper, we restrict our attention to distance-based single-peaked preferences and focus on a well-known class of parameterized mechanisms called ordered weighted average methods, which is proposed by Yager in 1988 and contains several practical implementations such as the standard average and the Olympic average. We comprehensively analyze their performance in terms of both incentives and fairness. More specifically, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on their parameters to achieve strategy-proofness, non-obvious manipulability, individual fair share, and proportional fairness, respectively.

cs.GT↗