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arXiv · 2609.14481

Quantifying Observable High-Frequency Swapping on Arbitrum

Abstract

Layer-2 rollups have reshaped Ethereum's transaction economy by replacing mempool competition with deterministic sequencing, sub-second block times, and negligible gas fees. While these properties suppress classical Miner/Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), they give rise to a new and previously unrecognized behavioral regime. In this paper, we introduce the concept of High-Frequency Swapping (HFS), referring to continuous single-hop swaps at machine cadence within decentralized exchanges. Despite its growing footprint, this phenomenon has not been systematically identified or quantified in prior work. We conduct a large-scale measurement of HFS on Arbitrum, using 18 months of full-chain data (Jan. 2023--Jun. 2024). Specifically, we construct a reproducible pipeline that isolates voluntary single-swap transactions, attributes them to the swapper level, and classifies HFS behavior through inter-arrival dynamics. The analysis uncovers 477 distinct HFS swappers responsible for nearly 30 million swaps and over $10^{11}$ USD in notional volume. Our study conducts a comprehensive empirical investigation of HFS from multiple perspectives. We begin with a global overview of activity patterns, and then examine temporal dynamics, swapper identity, token coverage, and venue concentration, and explore swap size, time gap, and order direction. Finally, we explore case-level behavior, including stablecoin arbitrage, CEX-DEX execution gaps, and short-horizon round-trip trading. Across these dimensions, we identify consistent structural regularities that distinguish HFS from conventional retail or arbitrage activity. This work provides a large-scale address-level empirical characterization of High-Frequency Swapping on Arbitrum and a broad empirical foundation for future research on decentralized market microstructure.

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BibTeXRIS

Shijian Chen, Ya Chen, Jing Cai, Catherine Liu. 2026-09-13. Quantifying Observable High-Frequency Swapping on Arbitrum. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.14481

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