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arXiv · 2609.33214

Learning from a Mixture of Information Sources

Abstract

We often learn from multiple sources that convey information in different ways. How informative is it to know the source of a signal, and how is this informativeness shaped by the distribution of sources? We extend the standard (binary-state, binary-signal) Blackwell experiment model by introducing a commonly known distribution over signaling schemes, representing the distribution of information sources. We compare learning under two information models: source-aware, where decision makers observe a signaling scheme and its realization (e.g., raw reviews, search results), and source-blind, where only the signal realization is observed (e.g., aggregate ratings, LLM-generated summaries). We show that a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of signaling schemes translates into Blackwell dominance for source-aware decision makers, implying they are "risk-loving" in information sources. In contrast, it has no impact on source-blind decision makers. When learning from repeated draws of signaling schemes, source-blind decision makers learn more slowly. However, as long as the average signaling scheme is $\varepsilon$ away from being completely uninformative, source-blind learning can match source-aware learning by using at most $O(1/\varepsilon)$ times more data.

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BibTeXRIS

Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Yaroslav Mukhin, Clayton Thomas, Ruqing Xu. 2026-09-27. Learning from a Mixture of Information Sources. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.33214

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