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arXiv · 2609.40225

L2R-EV: Learning What to Repair in Electric Ride-Pooling with Finite Charger Queues

Abstract

Electric ride-pooling must jointly manage passenger service, routes, batteries, and finite chargers; a locally useful relocation can reduce later service. We introduce a discrete-event ride-pooling simulator with ordered passenger stops, pickup and ride-time constraints, battery reserves, charger travel, and finite first-come, first-served (FCFS) charging queues. On top of a common dispatcher, we add a learned repair layer that moves uncollected passengers between vehicles, uses a supervised score to estimate later effects, and uses a two-stage proximal-policy-optimization (PPO) policy to focus computation on promising moves. Every executed move must satisfy route, battery, and time constraints and provide an immediate route-cost improvement. For larger instances, we limit the number of candidate moves and apply several non-conflicting repairs at once. On 12 held-out Manhattan episodes with 100 requests, 30 EVs, and one plug per station, supervised repair reduces operational cost by 6.57\% versus no repair (12/12 wins) and serves 74.92 rather than 72.75 requests. Two-stage PPO stays within 1.43\% of supervised repair with 95.4\% fewer exact trials, while our experiments scale to 8,000 requests and 2,400 EVs with cost reductions across all three larger development settings. Queue-aware charging reduces waiting by 41.0\%; under a declared 1.5-kW queue-idle load, operational electricity per served request falls 1.73\%.

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BibTeXRIS

Mai Pham, Vikrant S. Vaze, Peter Chin. 2026-09-30. L2R-EV: Learning What to Repair in Electric Ride-Pooling with Finite Charger Queues. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.40225

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