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Mai Pham

Publications and source records attributed to Mai Pham.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Differentiable Combinatorial Auction Design: Optimizing Revenue-Welfare-Fairness Frontiers With Graph Attention Networks

Designing optimal auctions for allocating public infrastructure-such as airport slots and energy resources-is challenging due to interdependent resources and complex side-constraints. While the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction guarantees maximum welfare, it cannot maximize revenue or accommodate the multi-objective trade-offs inherent in public infrastructure systems. We propose a differentiable, constraint-aware framework for combinatorial auction design that enables end-to-end learning of fractionally feasible, approximately strategy-proof mechanisms. Our primary contribution is a combinatorial constraint enforcement technique that ensures fractional feasibility by construction, bypassing the need for penalty-based approximations. We introduce CAGraph, a novel graph-based architecture designed to capture dependencies between items and bidders, alongside CANet and CAFormer as deep learning baselines, for combinatorial settings. We also provide a Matching Pursuit-inspired decomposition that maps fractional allocations to feasible discrete allocations and empirically evaluates the resulting discretization gap. In synthetic benchmarks and an airport slot-divestiture case study, respectively, the learned mechanisms achieve up to 73.5% and 180% higher expected revenue than VCG, under small empirical regret. Finally, we visualize the Pareto frontiers for revenue, welfare, and fairness, providing regulators with a decision-support tool to design infrastructure auctions that balance profitability, efficiency and equity.

cs.GT↗

Optimistic Policy Regularization: Elite-Statistic Reward Shaping

On-policy agents discard trajectories after each update, including rare high-return episodes. We propose Optimistic Policy Regularization (OPR), which turns those episodes into a closed-form reward bonus: we estimate an elite action prior from top-quartile episodes and add a \reviewblue{bounded transform of the log-ratio} of the prior to the policy's action distribution. OPR needs no auxiliary network, value gate, off-policy correction, or adversarial loop. It is a one-line modification of Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO)'s reward; yet, on 49 Atari games at 10M steps, $5\times$ fewer agent decisions than the 200M-frame baselines, it reaches a 148.4\% median human-normalized score (HNS; 196.9\% interquartile mean): higher scores than published PPO on $36/49$ games ($p{=}0.0014$) and a higher aggregate median than self-imitation learning, which falls well below OPR when frames and backbone are matched. We pair the method with a theory of when it works. The underlying log-ratio has an exact forward-KL interpretation; its pre-advantage placement propagates the signal through Generalized Advantage Estimation; and, under an idealized local update, its first-order effect depends on a prior-advantage alignment whose sign indicates help or harm. Since alignment varies across tasks and runs, we also study an online gating extension. On a ten-game set, it outperforms the backbone by $+17.4$ median HNS on average across seeds. Controlled experiments test temporal propagation and the tradeoffs of state conditioning and gating, supporting OPR as a simple regularizer with an analysis of where to shape.

cs.LG↗

L2R-EV: Learning What to Repair in Electric Ride-Pooling with Finite Charger Queues

Electric ride-pooling must jointly manage passenger service, routes, batteries, and finite chargers; a locally useful relocation can reduce later service. We introduce a discrete-event ride-pooling simulator with ordered passenger stops, pickup and ride-time constraints, battery reserves, charger travel, and finite first-come, first-served (FCFS) charging queues. On top of a common dispatcher, we add a learned repair layer that moves uncollected passengers between vehicles, uses a supervised score to estimate later effects, and uses a two-stage proximal-policy-optimization (PPO) policy to focus computation on promising moves. Every executed move must satisfy route, battery, and time constraints and provide an immediate route-cost improvement. For larger instances, we limit the number of candidate moves and apply several non-conflicting repairs at once. On 12 held-out Manhattan episodes with 100 requests, 30 EVs, and one plug per station, supervised repair reduces operational cost by 6.57\% versus no repair (12/12 wins) and serves 74.92 rather than 72.75 requests. Two-stage PPO stays within 1.43\% of supervised repair with 95.4\% fewer exact trials, while our experiments scale to 8,000 requests and 2,400 EVs with cost reductions across all three larger development settings. Queue-aware charging reduces waiting by 41.0\%; under a declared 1.5-kW queue-idle load, operational electricity per served request falls 1.73\%.

cs.GT↗

Strategic Cyber Defense via Reinforcement Learning-Guided Combinatorial Auctions

Cyber defense operations increasingly require long-term strategic planning under uncertainty and resource constraints. We propose a new use of combinatorial auctions for allocating defensive action bundles in a realistic cyber environment, using host-specific valuations derived from reinforcement learning (RL) Q-values. These Q-values encode long-term expected utility, allowing upstream planning. We train CAFormer, a differentiable Transformer-based auction mechanism, to produce allocations that are approximately incentive-compatible under misreporting. Rather than benchmarking against existing agents, we explore the qualitative and strategic properties of the learned mechanisms. Compared to oracle and heuristic allocations, our method achieves competitive revenue while offering robustness to misreporting. In addition, we find that allocation patterns correlate with adversarial and defensive activity, suggesting implicit alignment with operational priorities. Our results demonstrate the viability of auction-based planning in cyber defense and highlight the interpretability benefits of RL-derived value structures.

cs.GT↗

Advancing Differentiable Economics: A Neural Network Framework for Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

Differentiable economics, which uses neural networks as function approximators and gradient-based optimization in automated mechanism design (AMD), marked a significant breakthrough with the introduction of RegretNet \citep{regretnet_paper}. It combines the flexibility of deep learning with a regret-based approach to relax incentive compatibility, allowing for approximations of revenue-maximizing auctions. However, applying these techniques to combinatorial auctions (CAs) - where bidders value bundles rather than individual items, capturing item interdependencies - remains a challenge, primarily due to the lack of methodologies that can effectively deal with combinatorial constraints. To tackle this, we propose two architectures: CANet, a fully connected neural network, and CAFormer, a transformer-based model designed to learn optimal randomized mechanisms. Unlike existing methods in traditional AMD, our approach is more scalable and free of assumptions about the structures of allowable bundles or bidder valuations. We demonstrate that our models match current methods in non-combinatorial settings and set new benchmarks for CAs. Specifically, our models consistently outperform benchmark mechanisms derived from heuristic approaches and provide empirical solutions where analytical results are unavailable. This work bridges the gap in applying differentiable economics to combinatorial auctions, offering a scalable and flexible framework for designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms.

cs.GT↗