Two-sided Market Design Meets Autobidding

Abstract

Autobidding has become a dominant paradigm in online advertising by enabling advertisers to set high-level goals while algorithms handle real-time bid optimization. A prominent example is the Return-on-Spend (RoS) value maximizer, which maximizes total value subject to an aggregate value-per-spend constraint. While most work on mechanism design for autobidders focuses on one-sided markets, many real-world platforms involve strategic behavior on both sides. We initiate the study of two-sided markets with autobidders. We first establish a stark negative result: for the challenging objective of liquid gains from trade (LGFT) in the prior-free setting, broad classes of utility-truthful, budget-balanced mechanisms have unbounded Price of Anarchy (PoA) once value-maximizing agents are present, even in double-auction environments. We then give two positive results. In the prior-free repeated double-auction setting, McAfee's Trade Reduction mechanism has unbounded PoA for LGFT but achieves constant PoA for liquid welfare under RoS bidding, showing that off-the-shelf mechanisms retain meaningful welfare guarantees. With distributional information regarding the private costs and values, we design a two-sided mechanism that is incentive compatible for each agent under its corresponding objective, individually rational, ex-ante weakly budget balanced, and achieves first-best liquid welfare, equivalently optimal LGFT, whenever at least one side of the market consists of RoS value maximizers. This result applies to matching markets with general downward-closed feasibility constraints. It contrasts sharply with the Myerson--Satterthwaite impossibility theorem~\citep{MS83}, which rules out first-best efficiency with incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance even in bilateral trade when both the buyer and the seller are quasi-linear utility maximizers.