arXiv subjects

Christopher Liaw

Publications and source records attributed to Christopher Liaw.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided Markets

We study Bulow-Klemperer-style competition complexity in two-sided double auctions with $m$ unit-demand buyers drawn i.i.d. from $F_B$ and $n$ unit-supply sellers drawn i.i.d. from $F_S$. When $m \ge n$ and buyer valuations first-order stochastically dominate seller costs ($F_B \succeq_{\mathrm{FSD}} F_S$), we prove that recruiting just two additional sellers enables Seller Trade Reduction (STR), a prior-independent mechanism, to achieve expected Gains From Trade (GFT) at least the first-best GFT of the original market; symmetrically, when $m \le n$, Buyer Trade Reduction suffices with two additional buyers. This resolves open questions of Babaioff, Goldner, and Gonczarowski (SODA 2020) and Cai, Liaw, Mehta, and Zhao (STOC 2024). Moreover, this uniform bound is optimal: already for $m = n = 1$, no prior-independent mechanism (deterministic or randomized) that is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC), individually rational (IR), and weakly budget-balanced (WBB) matches the first-best GFT with one additional seller. We further extend our characterization to $r$-dominance ($F_B \succeq_r F_S$), where $r \in (0, 1]$ and $1 - F_B(x) \ge r(1 - F_S(x))$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}$ (recovering $F_B \succeq_{\mathrm{FSD}} F_S$ at $r = 1$). When $m \ge n \ge 1$, $c = \lceil 1/r \rceil + 1$ additional sellers suffice for STR to match or exceed the first-best GFT, while every prior-independent DSIC, IR, and WBB mechanism requires at least $\max(2, \lceil 1/r \rceil - 1)$ additional sellers even for $m = n = 1$, pinning down the optimal bound to within two traders. Finally, this $Θ(1/r)$ bound cannot be asymptotically improved even by recruiting on both sides: for $r < 1/64$ and $m = n = \lceil 2/(5r) \rceil$, every prior-independent DSIC, IR, and WBB mechanism requires $c \ge \lceil 1/(64r) \rceil = Ω(1/r)$ additional traders per side.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Cogentic: Multi-Agent Orchestration for Automated Proof Discovery

We present Cogentic, a multi-agent harness for automated proof discovery on open research problems. While frontier language models can generate strong mathematical ideas in a single shot, single-shot generation is often insufficient for open problems that require exploring multiple competing conjectures, overcoming subtle technical obstructions, and retaining intermediate progress over a long horizon. Cogentic addresses these challenges through an iterative prove-verify loop in which an orchestrator allocates a population of independent provers across distinct proof directions, subjects their output to adversarial verification by several specialized components, and promotes confirmed intermediate results into a persistent verified ledger that later rounds build on. The harness is designed to be able to solve research-level math and theoretical computer science problems. Using either Gemini 3.1 Pro or an early version of Gemini 4 Argon as the base model, Cogentic produced novel results on open problems across online learning, auction theory, and mechanism design. Each result was independently verified by domain experts and is developed in full in companion papers. We list these results, and new ones as they are verified, at https://sites.google.com/view/cogentic .

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Efficiency of Generalized Proportional First-Price Auctions Under Auto-bidding

Auto-bidding is now widely adopted in online advertising platforms, allowing advertisers to specify high-level campaign objectives--such as maximizing total value subject to a return-on-spend (ROS) constraint--rather than manual per-query bids. A central question in algorithmic mechanism design is characterizing the worst-case efficiency loss, or Price of Anarchy (PoA), across auction formats in this prior-free setting. While randomized auctions are known to strictly improve efficiency over deterministic mechanisms for two bidders, two fundamental questions have remained open: (1) what is the optimal PoA for two bidders, and (2) can any mechanism beat the barrier of 2 for general $n \ge 3$ bidders? We resolve both questions using the family of $r$-proportional first-price auctions ($\text{pFPA}_r$), in which each bidder wins with probability proportional to their bid raised to an exponent $r > 0$ and pays their bid upon winning. First, for two bidders, we prove that the standard proportional first-price auction ($r = 1$) achieves a tight $\text{PoA} \le 1.5$, complemented by a matching lower bound showing that no anonymous, monotone mechanism can do better. Second, for general $n \ge 2$ bidders, setting $r = 2n$ achieves $\text{PoA} \le 2 - \frac{1}{4n+1} = 2 - Ω(1/n)$ across all undominated bid profiles, breaking the deterministic barrier of 2 for every finite $n$ and asymptotically matching the known $2 - Θ(1/n)$ lower bound.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Two-sided Market Design Meets Autobidding

Autobidding has become a dominant paradigm in online advertising by enabling advertisers to set high-level goals while algorithms handle real-time bid optimization. A prominent example is the Return-on-Spend (RoS) value maximizer, which maximizes total value subject to an aggregate value-per-spend constraint. While most work on mechanism design for autobidders focuses on one-sided markets, many real-world platforms involve strategic behavior on both sides. We initiate the study of two-sided markets with autobidders. We first establish a stark negative result: for the challenging objective of liquid gains from trade (LGFT) in the prior-free setting, broad classes of utility-truthful, budget-balanced mechanisms have unbounded Price of Anarchy (PoA) once value-maximizing agents are present, even in double-auction environments. We then give two positive results. In the prior-free repeated double-auction setting, McAfee's Trade Reduction mechanism has unbounded PoA for LGFT but achieves constant PoA for liquid welfare under RoS bidding, showing that off-the-shelf mechanisms retain meaningful welfare guarantees. With distributional information regarding the private costs and values, we design a two-sided mechanism that is incentive compatible for each agent under its corresponding objective, individually rational, ex-ante weakly budget balanced, and achieves first-best liquid welfare, equivalently optimal LGFT, whenever at least one side of the market consists of RoS value maximizers. This result applies to matching markets with general downward-closed feasibility constraints. It contrasts sharply with the Myerson--Satterthwaite impossibility theorem~\citep{MS83}, which rules out first-best efficiency with incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance even in bilateral trade when both the buyer and the seller are quasi-linear utility maximizers.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Improved Revenue Guarantees for Selling Separately and Bundling

We study how much revenue a seller can lose by restricting attention to selling separately or grand bundling, in the setting of a single additive buyer with independent item values. Although revenue-optimal mechanisms can require lotteries and infinite menus, Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier, and Weinberg showed that the better of these two simple formats always achieves a constant fraction of optimal revenue. We prove that $\mathrm{OPT} \le 3.52 \max\{\mathrm{SREV}, \mathrm{BREV}\}$, where $\mathrm{SREV}$ and $\mathrm{BREV}$ are the optimal revenues from selling separately and grand bundling, respectively. This improves the previous best-known approximation factor of $5.2$ due to Ma and Simchi-Levi and narrows the gap to the known lower bound of $2$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Prediction with Expert Advice: Anytime Regret with Many Experts Matches the Fixed-Time Constant

Prediction with expert advice is a fundamental problem in online learning. When the time horizon $T$ is known in advance, the minimax cumulative regret over $n$ experts is asymptotically $\sqrt{\frac{T \ln n}{2}}$. This is achieved by the Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm with a learning rate tuned to $T$, and is known to be tight. If instead the regret bound is required to hold simultaneously at every time $t$, the best known guarantee has been $\sqrt{t \ln n}$---a factor of $\sqrt{2}$ worse---and it has remained unknown whether this factor of $\sqrt{2}$ is necessary. We show that it is not. We give an algorithm, requiring no knowledge of the horizon, whose cumulative regret satisfies $R_t \le \bigl(1 + O(\sqrt{\ln \ln n / \ln n})\bigr)\sqrt{t \ln n / 2}$ simultaneously for every $t \ge 1$.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2026

Efficient Online Inverse Optimization with $O(d)$ Regret

We give a deterministic algorithm for online inverse linear optimization with regret $O(d)$, uniform in the horizon and $O(d^{2})$ time per round. A bound of this order was obtained recently by Dewasurendra, settling a question of Gollapudi et al.\ and of Oki and Sakaue, but by an improper rule that enumerates covers at every scale and costs $T^{Θ(d)}$ a round; ours is the first efficient such bound and the first proper one. We build on the variable-metric framework of Sakaue et al., adding a self-normalized rank-one update, and we replace the $\log\det$ potential by the trace power $\tr(H^{-1/2})$, which is bounded outright and removes the $\ln T$. The bound also holds against an expert that does not optimize, and we give corruption-robust and rank-adaptive variants, and an application to convex minimization.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive Valuations

Budget-feasible mechanism design is a classic framework introduced by Singer, but there is still a wide gap between existing upper and lower bounds. In this paper, we significantly advance the state of the art. First, without computational constraints, we show that there exists a universally truthful budget-feasible mechanism with the following approximation ratios: - $3$ for monotone submodular valuations and $e+1$ for nonmonotone submodular valuations, improving over $3.798$ and $9.742$, respectively. - $e+1$ for XOS valuations, improving over $28$. In large markets, our approximation can be improved deterministically to $e$. - $2e+1$ for subadditive valuations, improving over $33$. In large markets, our approximation can be improved deterministically to $2e$. Moreover, for subadditive valuations, we obtain a constant-approximation mechanism that runs in polynomial time using demand queries. This improves over the previous best approximation of $O(\log \log n)$, resolving a long-standing open problem going back to Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer, who conjectured that a constant approximation requires exponentially many demand queries. We obtain these results through a simple and unifying framework based on non-truthful indirect mechanisms, recently coined compensation design. In particular, through a potential argument, we establish constant price-of-stability bounds for compensation design based on marginal-contribution payment rules, which we then translate into truthful direct mechanisms. For subadditive valuations, the core of the argument is a new smoothing lemma showing that every subadditive function can be approximated within a factor of $2$ by a self-bounding function. This is also of independent interest, readily addressing an open question in multiwinner elections by showing the existence of a $2e$-approximate core even under subadditive valuations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Compensation Design

We introduce compensation design, the problem of designing payment rules that incentivize high-quality contributions in decentralized environments. Here, a budget-constrained principal with a monotone submodular value function aims to design a payment rule, while agents decide whether to opt in or out depending on their private cost. We show that a simple cost-oblivious and anonymous marginal-contribution payment rule guarantees that pure Nash equilibria always exist and attain a price of anarchy (PoA) of at most $2+o_λ(1)$ in the large-market regime ($λ\to 0$) where each individual cost is at most a $λ$ fraction of the budget. We further show that the factor $2$ is unavoidable among deterministic cost-oblivious rules. Surprisingly, we identify a counterexample showing that a payment rule based on the Shapley value may admit no pure Nash equilibria. We then extend our scope to coarse correlated equilibria. This is further motivated by our intractability result: although a pure Nash equilibrium always exists, computing one is PLS-complete. We establish that coarse correlated equilibria also attain a PoA bound of at most $2+o_λ(1)$, and this guarantee in fact extends even under the payment rule induced by the Shapley value. Moreover, we move beyond monotone submodular value functions and binary actions. First, for (monotone) XOS valuations, we show that no oracle-efficient payment rule can attain a PoA bound of $O(n^{1/2 - ε})$. Second, for submodular but non-monotone valuations, we show that a broad class of natural payment rules fails to guarantee a bounded PoA. Finally, we extend compensation design to the setting where each agent has a combinatorial action set. We provide randomized payment rules with logarithmic PoA guarantees for subadditive values, and matching lower bounds that apply even in the single-agent additive-value setting.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

A Unified Approach to Submodular Maximization Under Noise

We consider the problem of maximizing a submodular function with access to a noisy value oracle for the function instead of an exact value oracle. Similar to prior work, we assume that the noisy oracle is persistent in that multiple calls to the oracle for a specific set always return the same value. In this model, Hassidim and Singer (2017) design a $(1-1/e)$-approximation algorithm for monotone submodular maximization subject to a cardinality constraint, and Huang et al (2022) design a $(1-1/e)/2$-approximation algorithm for monotone submodular maximization subject to any arbitrary matroid constraint. In this paper, we design a meta-algorithm that allows us to take any "robust" algorithm for exact submodular maximization as a black box and transform it into an algorithm for the noisy setting while retaining the approximation guarantee. By using the meta-algorithm with the measured continuous greedy algorithm, we obtain a $(1-1/e)$-approximation (resp. $1/e$-approximation) for monotone (resp. non-monotone) submodular maximization subject to a matroid constraint under noise. Furthermore, by using the meta-algorithm with the double greedy algorithm, we obtain a $1/2$-approximation for unconstrained (non-monotone) submodular maximization under noise.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2025

Risk-Averse and Optimistic Advertiser Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding

The rise of auto-bidding has created challenges for ensuring advertiser incentive compatibility, particularly when advertisers delegate bidding to agents with high-level constraints. One challenge in defining incentive compatibility is the multiplicity of equilibria. After advertisers submit reports, it is unclear what the result will be and one only has knowledge of a range of possible results. Nevertheless, Alimohammadi et al. proposed a notion of Auto-bidding Incentive Compatibility (AIC) which serves to highlight that auctions may not incentivize truthful reporting of constraints. However, their definition of AIC is very stringent as it requires that the worst-case outcome of an advertiser's truthful report is at least as good as the best-case outcome of any of the advertiser's possible deviations. Indeed, they show both First-Price Auction and Second-Price Auction are not AIC. Moreover, the AIC definition precludes having ordinal preferences on the possible constraints that the advertiser can report. In this paper, we introduce two refined and relaxed concepts: Risk-Averse Auto-bidding Incentive Compatibility (RAIC) and Optimistic Auto-bidding Incentive Compatibility (OAIC). RAIC (OAIC) stipulates that truthful reporting is preferred if its least (most) favorable equilibrium outcome is no worse than the least (most) favorable equilibrium outcome from any misreport. This distinction allows for a clearer modeling of ordinal preferences for advertisers with differing attitudes towards equilibrium uncertainty. We demonstrate that SPA satisfies both RAIC and OAIC. Furthermore, we show that SPA also meets these conditions for two advertisers when they are assumed to employ uniform bidding. These findings provide new insights into the incentive properties of SPA in auto-bidding environments, particularly when considering advertisers' perspectives on equilibrium selection.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Equilibria and Learning in Modular Marketplaces

We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given budget. This paper studies the market design problem in such an ecosystem, where module owners strategically set prices for their APIs (to maximize their profit) and a central platform orchestrates the aggregation of module outputs at query-time. One can also think about this as a first-price procurement auction with budgets. The first observation is that if the platform's algorithm is to find the optimal set of modules then this could result in a poor outcome, in the sense that there are price equilibria which provide arbitrarily low value for the user. We show that under a suitable version of the "bang-per-buck" algorithm for the knapsack problem, an $\varepsilon$-approximate equilibrium always exists, for any arbitrary $\varepsilon > 0$. Further, our first main result shows that with this algorithm any such equilibrium provides a constant approximation to the optimal value that the buyer could get under various constraints including (i) a budget constraint and (ii) a budget and a matroid constraint. Finally, we demonstrate that these efficient equilibria can be learned through decentralized price adjustments by module owners using no-regret learning algorithms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Agnostic Private Density Estimation for GMMs via List Global Stability

We consider the problem of private density estimation for mixtures of unrestricted high dimensional Gaussians in the agnostic setting. We prove the first upper bound on the sample complexity of this problem. Previously, private learnability of high dimensional GMMs was only known in the realizable setting [Afzali et al., 2024]. To prove our result, we exploit the notion of $\textit{list global stability}$ [Ghazi et al., 2021b,a] that was originally introduced in the context of private supervised learning. We define an agnostic variant of this definition, showing that its existence is sufficient for agnostic private density estimation. We then construct an agnostic list globally stable learner for GMMs.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2024

Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey

In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opportunities that have arisen as markets embrace this autobidding and cover a range of topics in this area, including bidding algorithms, equilibrium analysis and efficiency of common auction formats, and optimal auction design.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

User Response in Ad Auctions: An MDP Formulation of Long-Term Revenue Optimization

We propose a new Markov Decision Process (MDP) model for ad auctions to capture the user response to the quality of ads, with the objective of maximizing the long-term discounted revenue. By incorporating user response, our model takes into consideration all three parties involved in the auction (advertiser, auctioneer, and user). The state of the user is modeled as a user-specific click-through rate (CTR) with the CTR changing in the next round according to the set of ads shown to the user in the current round. We characterize the optimal mechanism for this MDP as a Myerson's auction with a notion of modified virtual value, which relies on the value distribution of the advertiser, the current user state, and the future impact of showing the ad to the user. Leveraging this characterization, we design a sample-efficient and computationally-efficient algorithm which outputs an approximately optimal policy that requires only sample access to the true MDP and the value distributions of the bidders. Finally, we propose a simple mechanism built upon second price auctions with personalized reserve prices and show it can achieve a constant-factor approximation to the optimal long term discounted revenue.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Mixtures of Gaussians are Privately Learnable with a Polynomial Number of Samples

We study the problem of estimating mixtures of Gaussians under the constraint of differential privacy (DP). Our main result is that $\text{poly}(k,d,1/α,1/\varepsilon,\log(1/δ))$ samples are sufficient to estimate a mixture of $k$ Gaussians in $\mathbb{R}^d$ up to total variation distance $α$ while satisfying $(\varepsilon, δ)$-DP. This is the first finite sample complexity upper bound for the problem that does not make any structural assumptions on the GMMs. To solve the problem, we devise a new framework which may be useful for other tasks. On a high level, we show that if a class of distributions (such as Gaussians) is (1) list decodable and (2) admits a "locally small'' cover (Bun et al., 2021) with respect to total variation distance, then the class of its mixtures is privately learnable. The proof circumvents a known barrier indicating that, unlike Gaussians, GMMs do not admit a locally small cover (Aden-Ali et al., 2021b).

stat.ML↗

arXiv2024

Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints

We study the efficiency of non-truthful auctions for auto-bidders with both return on spend (ROS) and budget constraints. The efficiency of a mechanism is measured by the price of anarchy (PoA), which is the worst case ratio between the liquid welfare of any equilibrium and the optimal (possibly randomized) allocation. Our first main result is that the first-price auction (FPA) is optimal, among deterministic mechanisms, in this setting. Without any assumptions, the PoA of FPA is $n$ which we prove is tight for any deterministic mechanism. However, under a mild assumption that a bidder's value for any query does not exceed their total budget, we show that the PoA is at most $2$. This bound is also tight as it matches the optimal PoA without a budget constraint. We next analyze two randomized mechanisms: randomized FPA (rFPA) and "quasi-proportional" FPA. We prove two results that highlight the efficacy of randomization in this setting. First, we show that the PoA of rFPA for two bidders is at most $1.8$ without requiring any assumptions. This extends prior work which focused only on an ROS constraint. Second, we show that quasi-proportional FPA has a PoA of $2$ for any number of bidders, without any assumptions. Both of these bypass lower bounds in the deterministic setting. Finally, we study the setting where bidders are assumed to bid uniformly. We show that uniform bidding can be detrimental for efficiency in deterministic mechanisms while being beneficial for randomized mechanisms, which is in stark contrast with the settings without budget constraints.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

The Power of Two-sided Recruitment in Two-sided Markets

We consider the problem of maximizing the gains from trade (GFT) in two-sided markets. The seminal impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite shows that even for bilateral trade, there is no individually rational (IR), Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) and budget balanced (BB) mechanism that can achieve the full GFT. Moreover, the optimal BIC, IR and BB mechanism that maximizes the GFT is known to be complex and heavily depends on the prior. In this paper, we pursue a Bulow-Klemperer-style question, i.e., does augmentation allow for prior-independent mechanisms to compete against the optimal mechanism? Our first main result shows that in the double auction setting with $m$ i.i.d. buyers and $n$ i.i.d. sellers, by augmenting $O(1)$ buyers and sellers to the market, the GFT of a simple, dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), and prior-independent mechanism in the augmented market is at least the optimal in the original market, when the buyers' distribution first-order stochastically dominates the sellers' distribution. Next, we go beyond the i.i.d. setting and study the power of two-sided recruitment in more general markets. Our second main result is that for any $ε> 0$ and any set of $O(1/ε)$ buyers and sellers where the buyers' value exceeds the sellers' value with constant probability, if we add these additional agents into any market with arbitrary correlations, the Trade Reduction mechanism obtains a $(1-ε)$-approximation of the GFT of the augmented market. Importantly, the newly recruited agents are agnostic to the original market.

cs.GT↗