Open problem: Computing Bayes-Nash equilibrium in simple security games

Vincent Conitzer

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arXiv · 2610.08796

Open problem: Computing Bayes-Nash equilibrium in simple security games

Vincent Conitzer

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Abstract

This is an open problem originally posed during the program "Economics and Computation" held in the Fall 2015 semester at the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing. It asks whether a (Bayes-)Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time for Bayesian simple security games.

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BibTeX RIS

Vincent Conitzer. 2026-06-01. Open problem: Computing Bayes-Nash equilibrium in simple security games. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.08796

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