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arXiv · 2611.17530

AI and the Two Margins of Work: Why Job Losses Show Up Before Job Creation

Abstract

Technological change acts on labor demand at two margins: adjustment within established activities and the creation of additional activities, often by new firms. Payroll statistics record the first promptly and the second late. In the computing era, firms that entered in 1978 or later held 42 percent of payroll by 1998 and entering cohorts kept about 80 percent of their payroll after five years; in the industries most exposed to automation, incumbents contracted before entrants accumulated, a sequence that is precise early in the period and suggestive by its end. We develop a model in which one AI capability lowers the full cost of acceptable output in existing production and makes additional projects worth attempting, with founder effort separate from hired hours. If operating products re-scale instantly, automation displaces no aggregate hours; if they take time, hours fall first and recover as incumbents re-expand and new products arrive, with the long-run sign set by income effects. Establishment job flows through the first quarter of 2026 show no gradient on language-model exposure on either margin, which is what the model predicts under the observed adoption path and also what no effect on payroll would look like; studies with founding-task exposure find entry rising 10 to 20 percent. We propose a net reinstatement ratio and show that statistics which record new work late overstate displacement for years.

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Mark Esposito, Liu Zhang. 2026-11-12. AI and the Two Margins of Work: Why Job Losses Show Up Before Job Creation. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.17530

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