arXiv · 2611.18893
Lightweight Replay Attack Detection via Interpretable Physical Descriptors
Abstract
This paper proposes a lightweight, interpretable audio anti-spoofing method that distinguishes between bona fide human speech and replay attacks by analyzing physical acoustic signatures rather than learned spectro-temporal patterns. Unlike black-box Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), our approach exploits fundamental physical invariants, specifically source kinematics, binaural phase dynamics, and aerodynamic consistency, captured via multi-channel microphone arrays. By extracting these explicit physical descriptors and classifying them with an efficient XGBoost model, we achieve detection performance (Equal Error Rate (EER) of 17.8% on 6-channel arrays) comparable to state-of-the-art deep learning baselines, but with a fraction of the computational cost. The proposed system operates with a 1 MB memory footprint and 0.9 s latency on a standard ARM Cortex-M7 microcontroller, enabling privacy-preserving, real-time liveness detection on edge devices.
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Saba Nasiri, Alireza Amirshahi, Milos Cernak. 2026-11-13. Lightweight Replay Attack Detection via Interpretable Physical Descriptors. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.18893
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