arXiv · cond-mat/0305356
Population Fragmentation and Party Dynamics in an Evolutionary Political Game
Abstract
We examine kinetic symmetry breaking phenomena in an evolutionary political game in which voters, inhabiting a multidimensional ideological space, cast ballots via selection mechanisms subject to the competing forces of conformity and dissent. Our understanding of the spatiotemporally complex population dynamics is informed by a system of nonlinear replicator equations, discrete deterministic cousin of the original stochastic Seceder Model.
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Arne Soulier, Tim Halpin-Healy. 2003-05-15. Population Fragmentation and Party Dynamics in an Evolutionary Political Game. https://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0305356
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