arXiv · cond-mat/0404694
Similarity based cooperation and spatial segregation
Abstract
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial extension to a two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts with eight players in a Moore neighborhood. The system shows a strong segregation independent on parameters. The introduction of a local conversion mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of spiral waves in the spatial game. In the case of asymmetric costs of cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending on both cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed point of a forecast rule in the symmetric game, which corresponds to cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes unstable for high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.
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Arne Traulsen, Jens Christian Claussen. 2005-01-04. Similarity based cooperation and spatial segregation. https://doi.org/10.1103/physreve.70.046128
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