arXiv · math/0407529
Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?
Abstract
Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general, scientific, discourse cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical, Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of Peano Arithmetic is verifiably complete. We show how some paradoxical concepts of Quantum mechanics can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a constructive definition of mathematical truth.
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Bhupinder Singh Anand. 2004-07-30. Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?. https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0407529
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