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Bhupinder Singh Anand

Publications and source records attributed to Bhupinder Singh Anand.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2024

Why the classes P and NP are not well-defined finitarily

We distinguish finitarily between algorithmic verifiability, and algorithmic computability, to show that Goedel's 'formally' unprovable, but 'numeral-wise' provable, arithmetical proposition [(Ax)R(x)] can be finitarily evidenced as: algorithmically verifiable as 'always' true, but not algorithmically computable as 'always' true. Hence, though [R(x)] is algorithmically verifiable as a tautology, it is not algorithmically computable as a tautology by any Turing machine, whether deterministic or non-deterministic. By interpreting the PvNP problem arithmetically, rather than set-theoretically, we conclude that the clkasses P and NP are not well-defined finitarily since it immediately follows that SAT is neither in P nor in NP.

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arXiv2021

A pictorial proof of the Four Colour Theorem

We give a pictorial proof that transparently illustrates why four colours suffce to chromatically differentiate any set of contiguous, simply connected and bounded, planar spaces; by showing that there is no minimal planar map. We show, moreover, why the proof cannot be expressed within classical graph theory.

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arXiv2015

A density-based approach for non-heuristic approximations of prime counting functions

All the known approximations of the number of primes pi(n) not exceeding any given integer n are derived from real-valued functions that are asymptotic to pi(x), such as x/log x, Li(x) and Riemann's function R(x). The degree of approximation for finite values of n is determined only heuristically, by conjecturing upon an error term in the asymptotic relation that can be seen to yield a closer approximation than others to the actual values of pi(n) within a finite range of values of n. By considering the density of each of the set of (i) all integers n, (ii) Dirichlect integers n = a+md, and (iii) Twin integers (n, n+2), which are not divisible by any of the first k primes, we show that---based on their respective densities---the expected number of such integers in the initial interval (1, n) of length n non-heuristically approximates the number of (a) primes, (b) Dirichlect primes, and (c) Twin primes, respectively, which are less than or equal to n. We further show that, in each case, the estimate tends to infinity.

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arXiv2012

Some consequences of interpreting the associated logic of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA finitarily

We show that the classical interpretations of Tarski's inductive definitions actually allow us to define the satisfaction and truth of the quantified formulas of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA over the domain N of the natural numbers in two essentially different ways: (a) in terms of algorithmic verifiabilty; and (b) in terms of algorithmic computability. We show that the classical Standard interpretation I_PA(N, Standard) of PA essentially defines the satisfaction and truth of the formulas of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA in terms of algorithmic verifiability. It is accepted that this classical interpretation---in terms of algorithmic verifiabilty---cannot lay claim to be finitary; it does not lead to a finitary justification of the Axiom Schema of Finite Induction of PA from which we may conclude---in an intuitionistically unobjectionable manner---that PA is consistent. We now show that the PA-axioms---including the Axiom Schema of Finite Induction---are, however, algorithmically computable finitarily as satisfied / true under the Standard interpretation I_PA(N, Standard) of PA; and that the PA rules of inference do preserve algorithmically computable satisfiability / truth finitarily under the Standard interpretation I_PA(N, Standard). We conclude that the algorithmically computable PA-formulas can provide a finitary interpretation I_PA(N, Algorithmic) of PA from which we may classically conclude that PA is consistent in an intuitionistically unobjectionable manner. We define this interpretation, and show that if the associated logic is interpreted finitarily then (i) PA is categorical and (ii) Goedel's Theorem VI holds vacuously in PA since PA is consistent but not omega-consistent.

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arXiv2011

A case for weakening the Church-Turing Thesis

We conclude from Goedel's Theorem VII of his seminal 1931 paper that every recursive function f(x_{1}, x_{2}) is representable in the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA by a formula [F(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3})] which is algorithmically verifiable, but not algorithmically computable, if we assume that the negation of a universally quantified formula of the first-order predicate calculus is always indicative of the existence of a counter-example under the standard interpretation of PA. We conclude that the standard postulation of the Church-Turing Thesis does not hold if we define a number-theoretic formula as effectively computable if, and only if, it is algorithmically verifiable; and needs to be replaced by a weaker postulation of the Thesis as an equivalence.

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arXiv2011

A simple finitary proof of Goodstein's Theorem

We assumed that, for every natural number k, there is a natural number u such that the (k-1)th term of G(u) is k^k, and that G(u) terminates finitely. It immediately follows that every Goodstein Sequence G(m) over the natural numbers must terminate finitely. The assumption is easily seen to be false since there is no m such that the third term of g(m) is 4^4.

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arXiv2011

How definitive is the standard interpretation of Goodstein's argument?

Goodstein's argument is essentially that the hereditary representation m_{[b]} of any given natural number m in the natural number base b can be mirrored in Cantor Arithmetic, and used to well-define a finite decreasing sequence of transfinite ordinals, each of which is not smaller than the ordinal corresponding to the corresponding member of Goodstein's sequence of natural numbers G(m). The standard interpretation of this argument is first that G(m) must therefore converge; and second that this conclusion---Goodstein's Theorem---is unprovable in Peano Arithmetic but true under the standard interpretation of the Arithmetic. We argue however that even assuming Goodstein's Theorem is indeed unprovable in PA, its truth must nevertheless be an intuitionistically unobjectionable consequence of some constructive interpretation of Goodstein's reasoning. We consider such an interpretation, and construct a Goodstein functional sequence to highlight why the standard interpretation of Goodstein's argument ought not to be accepted as a definitive property of the natural numbers.

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arXiv2010

Does resolving PvNP require a paradigm shift?

I shall argue that a resolution of the PvNP problem requires building an iff bridge between the domain of provability and that of computability. The former concerns how a human intelligence decides the truth of number-theoretic relations, and is formalised by the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA following Dededekind's axiomatisation of Peano's Postulates. The latter concerns how a human intelligence computes the values of number-theoretic functions, and is formalised by the operations of a Turing Machine following Turing's analysis of computable functions. I shall show that such a bridge requires objective definitions of both an `algorithmic' interpretation of PA, and an `instantiational' interpretation of PA. I shall show that both interpretations are implicit in the definition of the subjectively defined `standard' interpretation of PA. However the existence of, and distinction between, the two objectively definable interpretations---and the fact that the former is sound whilst the latter is not---is obscured by the extraneous presumption under the `standard' interpretation of PA that Aristotle's particularisation must hold over the structure N of the natural numbers. I shall argue that recognising the falseness of this belief awaits a paradigm shift in our perception of the application of Tarski's analysis (of the concept of truth in the languages of the deductive sciences) to the `standard' interpretation of PA. I shall then show that an arithmetical formula [F] is PA-provable if, and only if, [F] interprets as true under an algorithmic interpretation of PA. I shall finally show how it then follows from Goedel's construction of a formally `undecidable' arithmetical proposition that there is a Halting-type PA formula which---by Tarski's definitions---is algorithmically verifiable as true, but not algorithmically computable as true, under a sound interpretation of PA.

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arXiv2009

The significance of Nathanson's 'boss' factor in legitimising Aristotle's particularisation: Why we need to revise current interpretations of Cantor's, Goedel's, Turing's and Tarski's formal reasoning

I show--contrary to common beliefs tolerated by the 'bosses'--that any interpretation of ZF that admits Aristotle's particularisation is not sound; that the standard interpretation of PA is not sound; that PA is consistent but omega-inconsistent; that a sound finitary interpretation of PA is definable in terms of Turing-computability; and that PA cannot be consistently extended to ZF.

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arXiv2007

Two presumptions in Goedel's interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning that are classically objectionable

Standard expositions of Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions are based on two presumptions in Goedel's 1931 interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning - one each in Theorem VI and in Theorem XI - which do not meet Goedel's, explicitly stated, requirement of classically constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, reasoning. We see how these objections can be addressed, and note some consequences.

math.GM↗
arXiv2007

An elementary proof that P =/= NP

We show that, if PA has no non-standard models, then P=/=NP. We then give an elementary proof that PA has no non-standard models.

math.GM↗
arXiv2006

Why we shouldn't fault Lucas and Penrose for continuing to believe in the Goedelian argument against computationalism

The only fault we can fairly lay at Lucas' and Penrose's doors, for continuing to believe in the essential soundness of the Goedelian argument, is their naive faith in, first, non-verifiable assertions in standard expositions of classical theory, and, second, in Goedel's unvalidated interpretation of his own formal reasoning. We show why their faith is misplaced in both instances.

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arXiv2005

Three Theorems on modular sieves that suggest the Prime Difference is O(Number of primes < (p(n)^1/2))

This 1964 paper developed as an off-shoot to the foundational query: Do we discover the natural numbers (Platonically), or do we construct them linguistically? The paper also assumes computational significance in the light of Agrawal, Kayal and Saxena's August 2000 paper, "PRIMES is in P", since both the TRIM and Compact Number Generating algorithms - each of which generates all the primes - are deterministic algorithms that run in polynomial time and suggest that the Prime Difference, d(n), is O(Number of primes < (p(n)^1/2)).

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arXiv2005

Naive Philosophical Foundations

This soliloquy outlines some naive philosophical arguments underlying the thesis that mathematics ought to be viewed simply as a universal set of languages, some of precise expression, and some of effective communication.

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arXiv2005

PA is instantiationally complete, but algorithmically incomplete: An alternative interpretation of Goedelian incompleteness under Church's Thesis that links formal logic and computability

We define instantiational and algorithmic completeness for a formal language. We show that, in the presence of Church's Thesis, an alternative interpretation of Goedelian incompleteness is that Peano Arithmetic is instantiationally complete, but algorithmically incomplete. We then postulate a Provability Thesis that links Peano Arithmetic and effective algorithmic computability, just as Church's Thesis links Recursive Arithmetic and effective instantiational computability.

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arXiv2005

The Mechanist's Challenge

Did we really hope to get away with The Goedelian Argument? A critical response to J. R. Lucas' 1996 articulation of his 1961 argument.

math.GM↗
arXiv2005

The Goebbellian Syndrome

Can we really falsify truth by dictat? A critical note on J. R. Lucas' 1996 remarks concerning non-standard models of first-order Peano Arithmetic.

math.GM↗