arXiv · math/0507044
PA is instantiationally complete, but algorithmically incomplete: An alternative interpretation of Goedelian incompleteness under Church's Thesis that links formal logic and computability
Abstract
We define instantiational and algorithmic completeness for a formal language. We show that, in the presence of Church's Thesis, an alternative interpretation of Goedelian incompleteness is that Peano Arithmetic is instantiationally complete, but algorithmically incomplete. We then postulate a Provability Thesis that links Peano Arithmetic and effective algorithmic computability, just as Church's Thesis links Recursive Arithmetic and effective instantiational computability.
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Bhupinder Singh Anand. 2005-07-03. PA is instantiationally complete, but algorithmically incomplete: An alternative interpretation of Goedelian incompleteness under Church's Thesis that links formal logic and computability. https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0507044
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